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PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE 



AN ADDRESS 

DELIVERED ON THE OCCASION OF THE NINETY-SEVENTH 

CONVOCATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 

DECEMBER 21. 1915, AND BEFORE THE 

INDUSTRIAL CLUB OF CHICAGO 

ON JANUARY 27. 1916 



BY 



HON. WALTER L. FISHER 

FORMER SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR 




PRESENTED BY MR. LA FOLLETTE 

Febbuary 14, 1916.— Ordered to be printed 



WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1916 






D, of D„ 
MAR H 1916 



f 

0^^ 



ft PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE.' 

Walter L. Fishek, fox'mer Secretary of the Interior. 

Half truths are dangerous because the element of truth which 
they contain carries conviction and easily leads to its application far 
beyond the real significance to which it is entitled. We are at 
present in grave danger of just such a misconception of one of the 
most prevalent statements with regard to military preparation. The 
sentiment of this country is undoubtedly opposed to militarism. 
Our ideals and purposes are peaceful. No imperialistic propaganda 
could hope to succeed if its character and purposes were understood. 
The agitation for increasing our military forces is as a whole 
genuinely peaceful in its purpose. Certainly it makes its great ap- 
peal upon the ground that preparation for war is essential for the 
preservation of peace. The proverbs of the ancients and the utter- 
ances of our early Presidents are the mottoes it repeats : Si vis pacem 
para helium^ " If you wish peace prepare for war." 

And undoubtedly in a world where selfishness and greed and lust 
of power still move the mass and the rulers of men to the extent 
they do to-day, where force is still believed to constitute a necessary 
if not a proper means of advancing national interests and national 
ideals, military preparation against war is an essential for securing 
peace. But there is real danger that we shall be misled — or may 
deceive ourselves — into believing that preparation for war is the 
most important thing for us if we desire to secure our own peace 
and to promote the peace of the world. Nothing, it seems to me, 
could be more unfortunate than such a result. If we wish peace, the 
most important thing is not to prepare for war — although that we 
should do. If we wish peace^ the most important — the all-impor- 
tant — thing is to prepare for peace; to do the things that make for 
peace and that promote peace, not the things that make for war and 
promote war. And yet these peaceful measures are the things that 
are receiving scant attention. 

I am led to present to you some thoughts upon this subject because 
the significance of the great war in which the larger part of the 
civilized world is now engaged is the one absorbing interest of our 
Avhole intellectual life. I have no thought that I shall say things 
that have not been better said by others — that I have anything 
original to impart. I am moved by a deep conviction that mankind 
is struggling with destiny as it has seldom struggled before, and that 
it is the duty of every man and woman — and especially of every 
educated man and woman — to think of this world war, its causes, 
and its probable results; and, as his thoughts become at all definite, 
to express them, if it be only in confirmation of, or dissent from, the 

^^ Delivered (in part) as an address on the occasion of the Ninety-seventh Convocation 
of the University of Chicago held in I.eon !Mandel Assemhly Hall, December 21, 1915. 
Delivered on January 27, 1916, before the Industrial Club of Chicago. 



4 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 

views expressed by others which are likely to affect public opinion 
and public action. It is a time for each human being, in humility 
and sincerity, to ask himself: "What do I think? What is the ex- 
planation of this appalling catastrophe and what is to follow it? 
What should and what can I, in my tiny circle of possible action, do 
to help, if ever so little, toward a right solution of the problems it 
presents ? •' 

What might be called its purel}' academic interest is greater than 
any other interest of the student. It pervades the library and the 
laboratory, the classroom and the lecture hall, and the quiet cloisters 
of the university. What a compelling stimulus to intellectual activity 
it is; what a zest it adds to all our studies in physical, political, social, 
and economic science; to what fierce tests it is subjecting our theories 
of human progress and social evolution ! 

There is nothing, indeed, so instructive, so absorbing, so essential 
for us — as individuals and as a nation — to understand as the mighty 
conflict that is now going on ; its causes and its consequences, its 
horrors and its folly. It is important for all of us to appreciate the 
reality of its horror. But I am not qualified to picture this horror if 
I would, and this is not the place or the occasion. It is fitting, how- 
ever, for us to consider its folly, and how we in the future may 
escape such folly. " Wisdom is the principal thing ; therefore get 
wisdom : and Avith all thy getting get understanding." 

There is a call for the public service of educated men and women 
such as has not been heard in the world since the French Revolution. 
For we must go back to France and the Napoleonic era for any such 
epochal events as are happening in the world to-day. It is quite pos- 
sible, perhaps it is exceedingly probable, that the actual consequences 
upon our whole intellectual, social, political, and economic outlook 
that will follow and result from this war will be greater than those 
that followed even that great upheaval of civilized society. It is 
only as we understand how fundamental are the issues that are forced 
upon us that we shall meet those issues intelligently and wisely. Our 
danger, and the danger of Europe, is that we shall see its causes and 
effects superficially and shall devise superficial remedies and adopt a 
superficial settlement. There are so many essentially superficial 
phases of the situation that are nevertheless so important and so com- 
pelling in their interest that we can all be forgiven for misconceiving 
their relative importance compared with the deeper issues; but it 
is only as we find and face these deeper issues of transcendent conse- 
quence that we shall work good out of this awful evil that has fallen 
on mankind. 

Already the danger of one great folly from a superficial view of 
this war has become apparent, and that is that we shall think of it as 
due to and as an exhibition of ruthless military power; that it is due 
to what is called Prussianism, and that if we could just curb and 
destroy Prussianism the world could go on quite satisfactorily, upon 
the whole, and without any serious or fundamental disturbance of the 
established social, political, economic, and intellectual order. No 
mistake could be made so disastrous to the future peace and progress 
of mankind as this. Even if the Prussian war god sits the saddle in 
Germany to-day, waging war with a ruthlessness that appalls man- 
kind and an efficiencv that compels its admiration, nevertheless, how 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 5 

pitiful would be the conclusion that what appalls us is not war, but 
merely the ruthlessness and efficiency with which it is made. 

It was an American thinking of war in America wiio said that 
" War is hell ! " — not German war or English war or Russian war, 
but war, wherever waged or by wdiatever nation. There was never 
a great war waged that did not produce all the atrocities of this war, 
on one side or on both. The scale of the atrocities may be greater, as 
the scale of this war is greater. Even the doctrine of f rightfulness is 
a doctrine that has been defended and practiced by every nation, even 
our own, within such limits and under such conditions as each nation 
has determined for itself at the time and according to its exigency 
as it saw it. There are few" follies equal to the folly of imagining 
that war can be made humane. 

Our own " Instructions for the government of armies of the United 
States in the field" (General Orders, No. 100, 1863), issued under 
Abraham Lincoln, the most humane of Presidents, and again issued 
without modification during the War with Spain in 1898, announced : 

To save the country is paramount to all other considerations. 

And— 

IS. When the conunander of a besieged place expels the uonconibatants in 
order to lessen the number of those who consume his stock of provisions, it is 
lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten on the 
surrender. 

19. Conuuanders, whenever admissible, should inform the enemy of their 
intention to bombard a place, so that the noncombatants, and especially the 
women and children, may be removed befoi*e the bombardment commences. 
But it is no infraction of the common law of war to omit thus to inform the 
enemy. Surprise may be a necessity. 

No matter how clear the evidence may seem to some of us to-day, 
we are too near the event to be sure of our perspective. We must not 
forget how often " knowledge comes, but wisdom lingers." Even if 
we make certain that Servia was the occasion, not the cause, of this 
war: that Germany had prepared for "the day" and that she chose 
the day which she thought was most favorable to her; that she. and 
no other, precipitated this horrible cataclysm of cruelty and destruc- 
tion — even if we spare whatever nation is responsible, no part of the 
just condemnation of mankind for touching the match to the powder 
that had been so assiduously laid throughout Europe and that needed 
only the match — how blind, howqoitifully and perversely blind, we 
should be not to recognize that the fundamental error consisted in 
having a state of international relations that was prepared for the 
match ; that the fundamental responsibility, deeper than Prussian- 
ism, was w^ith the nations that built and maintained their civiliza- 
tions over a powder magazine ! Without now discussing whether any 
other basis of internationalism is practicable than the basis of na- 
tional armament and of military force, how foolish, how unfair, to 
say that in a society of nations based on force that nation which 
acquires and uses the greatest and the most efficient force is exclu- 
sively to blame for an explosion that leads to a test of force! The 
matured and distant judgment of mankind will be little concerned 
with awarding praise or blame on the basis of the relative extent or 
officiency of military preparation, or even of the relative ruthlessness 
with which military force was used in a state of societv based on 



6 PREPARATIOXS FOR PEACE. 

force and on the use of force to secure or to retain the right to exploit 
other lands and peoples. 

The truth is that the really great differences between the warring 
nations are only differences of degree — degrees of militarism, degrees 
of democracy, degrees of political and economic intelligence. I do 
not minimize these differences. So gigantic is the scale on which the 
world movement proceeds that these differences of degree become 
of huge dimensions and importance when the diverging lines are 
projected into the expanded Held of action. In war, international 
differences are centrifugal. Chasms widen as the circumference of 
the conflict expands and the conflict becomes more intense. War 
distorts and exaggerates and intensifies every difference of national 
feeling, every national misunderstanding. If. however, it be true 
that Germany is more militaristic than England or France or Russia 
or Italy, it is true only as a statement of the degree in which each of 
these nations has been and is militaristic. If it be true that Germany 
believes that she has a national ideal and peculiar national interests — 
political, economic, intellectual — which can be advanced by military 
force, the same thing is true of each of her rivals. If it be true that 
militarism in Germany is a menace to the world, it is also true that 
militarism in the rest of Europe is a menace to the world. Does Ger- 
many believe that she has a peculiar mission to perform in the un- 
folding of civilization, that her form of political organization, her 
economic and intellectual processes, offer the greatest assurance of 
human progress, and that it is her duty as well as her right to impose 
this hiiltur on the world? England has been obsessed by the same 
megalomaniac folly. So have we. If, happily, we are less sure that 
we are the people, anel that wisdom is in clanger lest it die with us, 
can we claim anything more than that we have seen the futility of 
such egotism, ever so little sooner and ever so little more clearly than 
some others? Are John Bull and Brother Jonathan types of modest 
self-effacement and humility before the slowly unfolding secrets of 
the universe? 

We have been reading much of the lords and prophets of war in 
Germany; but have they uttered anything more frankly militaristic 
than Lord Roberts, " Little Bobs," the military idol of Great Britain ? 

How was tliis Eiiipiri' of r>i"itain founded? \<\w foiiiulod this Empire — war 
and conquest ! When we, therefore, masters hy war of one-tliird of the liabit- 
able slobe, when ire propose to Gernumy to disarm, to curtail her navy or 
diminish her army, Germany naturally refuses ; and pointing not witliout 
justice to the road by which England, sword in hand, lias climbed to her un- 
matched eminence, declares openly or in the veiled lannuase of diplomacy, that 
by the same path, if by no other, Germany is determined also to ascend! Who 
amongst us, knowing the past of this nation, and the past of all nations and cities 
that have ever added the luster of their name to luunan annals, can accuse Ger- 
many or regard the utterance of one of her greatest a year iind a half ago |or 
of General Rernhardi three months agol with any feelings except those of 
respect ? 

Norman Angell, in his recent book on America and the New 
World State, has collected this and many other quotations which 
demonstrate that there is an " Anglo-Saxon Prussianism " which 
differs only from German Prussianism in the extent to which it has 
attained popular support or official power. And yet it was the bitter 
complaint of Bernhardi and Trietschke that their ideas had so little 
influence among the people or in official circles. The most interesting 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACK. 7 

to me of all Angell's quotations is that from the Belgian author, 
Doctor Sarolea, who, in his book on The Anglo-German Problem, 
says : 

What is even more serious and ominous, so fur jis the prospects of peace are 
concerneil, the German who knows that lie is right from his own point of view, 
l<nows that lie is also right from the English point of view; he knows that the 
premises on which he is reasoning are still accepted by a large section of the 
English people. Millions of English people are actuated in their policy by 
those vei-y imperialistic principles on which the Germans take their stand. 
After all German statesmen are only applying the political lessons which Eng- 
land has taught them, which Mr. Kudyard Kipling has sung, and Mr. Chamber- 
lain has pi'oclaimed in speeches innumerable. Both the English Imperialist and 
the German Imperialist believe that the greatness of a country does not depend 
mainly on the virtues of the people, or on the resources of the home country, 
but largely on the capacity of the home country to acquire and to retain large 
tracts of territory all over the world. Both the English Imperialist and the 
German Im]ierialist have learned the doctrine of Admiral ]Mahan, that the 
greatness and prosperity of a country depend mainly on sea power. Both 
believe that efficiency and success in war is one of the main conditions of 
national prosperity. 

Now as long as the two nations do not rise to a saner political ideal, as long 
as both English and German people are agreed in accepting the current political 
philosophy, as long as both nations shall consider military power not merely as 
a necessary and temporary evil to submit to, but as a permanent and noble 
ideal to strive after, the German argument remains unanswerable. War is 
indeed predestined, and no diplomatists sitting round a great table in the 
Wilhelmstrasse or the Ballplatz or the Quai d'Orsay will be able to ward off the 
inevitable. It is only, therefore, in so far as both nations will move away from 
the old political philosophy that an understanding between Germany and 
England will become possible. * * * jj- j^ ^i^g ideas and the ideals that 
must be fundamentally changed : " Instauratio facienda ab imis fundamentis." 
And those ideals once changed, all motives for a war between England and Ger- 
many would vanish as by magic. But alas ! ideas and ideals do not change by 
magic or prestige — they can only change by the slow operation of intellectual 
conversion. Arguments alone can do it. 

Let US turn from the war lords of England and Germany to those 
who do not speak under the influence of military training or military 
occupation. We are told by the translator of Dr. Paul Rohrbach's 
book, The German Idea in the World, that it — 

probably inspired more Germans tlian any other book published since 1871, for 
everybo<ly felt that it presented a generally true pictui-e of the Fatherlan<l 
and indicated the paths which the Germans had resolved to follow. 

This opinion I have had substantial!}' confirmed by most compe- 
tent authority. I think it gives us a real insight into the ideas that 
have moved the German people. You will note that the author does 
not hesitate to praise the Anglo-Saxon or to criticize the German, 
and that his underlying and dominating purpose is peaceful ex- 
pansion. 

The markets of the world ! We need them to-day for oui* existence as posi- 
tively as we need our own land, and the day is approaching with irrevocable 
certainty when we shall need them even more. We can be nationally healthy 
only so long as our share in the business of the world continues to grow, 
and only if this is the case shall we be able to foster the innei- values which 
spring from our national idea, and let them take part with the other factors 
in the shaping of the culture of the world. * * * 

The German idea, therefore, can only live and increase if its material founda- 
tions, viz, the number of Germans, the prosperity of Germany, and the number 
and size of our world interests continfle to increase. As these foundations 
continue to gi-ow they compel the Anglo-Saxons to make their decision between 
the following two propositions : 



8 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 

Will they reconcile themselves to seeing onr interests in the world maintain 
themselves by the side of their own and come to an agreement with us con- 
cerning them? Or will they fight, with force of arms, to remain the sole mis- 
tress of the world? If they choose the latter, it will depend on our strength 
whether we conquer or surrender or hold our own. * * * 

We have progressed within a generation with a rapidity which creates the 
belief that we can wipe out within a decade the losses of a century. But we 
urov/ dizzy when we contemplate our political economy shooting up to steep 
heights and resting only on the small support of Eui'opean Germany, especially 
when we compare it with the much wider security across oceans and continents 
which England and America have built. It is here where the abyss is lurking 
into whicli our new grandeur may be hurled imless we secure it with stronger 
props than are luade of iron or gold. We have now reached the point which 
illustrates a fact which no one can view too seriously, namely, that the world 
|)Ovver of the Anglo-Saxons does not rest solely on external support, such as 
wealth, colonies, dominion over the seas and flourishing industries, but that 
corresponding to these material possessions a growth of character and of 
inner worth and an increase in the breadth of the Anglo-Saxon idea have 
actually justilied the people possessing them in reaching out for the dominion 
of the world. * * * 

The true attitude of England toward our navy and commerce is revealed by 
such comments as were contained in the famous article in the Saturday Review 
of September. 1897, which made a great stir in England and the whole world, 
and frankly stated that England's prosperity could only be saved if Germany 
were destroyed. " England," the article says in part, " with her long history 
of successful aggression, with her marvelous conviction that in pursuing her 
own interests she is spreading light among nations ilwelling in darkness, and 
Germany, bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with a lesser will 
force, but perhaps with a keener intelligence, coiupete in every corner of the 
globe. In the Transvaal, at the Cape, in Central Africa, in India and the East, 
the islands of the Southern Sea, and in the far Northwest, wherever — and 
where has it not? — the flag has followed the Bible and trade has followed the 
rtag there the German bagman is struggling with the English peddler. Is there 
a mine to exploit, a railway to build, a native to convert from breadfruit to 
tinned meat, from temperance to trade gin, the German and the Englishman 
iire struggling to be first. A luillion petty disputes build up the greatest cause 
of war the world has ever seen. If Germany were extinguished to-morrow, 
the day after to-morrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would 
not be richer. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succes- 
sion. Must they not fight for two hundred fifty million pounds of conunerce?" 

Doctor Rohrbach says: 

We know very well that it does n(»t i-eflect the feelings of the whole of Eng- 
land, but nevertheless of a considerable portion of the English Nation. * * * 

The two jiolitical catch words, "reaction" and "government by feudal 
classes," which foreign public opinion frequently uses to describe German 
conditions, are not calculated to bring success to the German idea in the world. 
But they are not the oidy obstacles. liike other people, we suffer from the 
defects of our virtues. The reverse and unfortiuiate complement of that sense 
of duty and industry, which we call the positive poles of our character, are 
an offensive superiority and awkwardness of behavior, which are constantly 
putting us at a disadvantage. * * * Between these two observations there 
is so much German awkwardness, indolence, and ignorance of the national 
idea in its highest sense that we can explain the progress abroad which we 
have made only by the one thing in which we excel all other people : our exact 
and conscientious labor and our remarkable diligence. 

Tlic i-eal evil lies in the docti-ine of i)olitical and economic im- 
perialism conunon to so many nations- — the doctrine that holds that 
the economic welfare and prog'ress of every nation and of its people 
depend upon securing constantly exi)anding markets and sources of 
supply, constantly expanding opji)ortunities for trade, and that such 
opportunities are only to be found, or at least are best to be found, 
by acquiring political dominion over or sj)heres of influence in other 
i.'ountries, especially in coiuiti'ies relati\ely backwai'd in industrial 



PEEPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 9 

development but capable of such development. If this is sound doc- 
trine economically, if it really is enlightened selfishness, if it is not 
to be restrained by the sense of moral obligation to respect the rights 
of other nations, if, indeed, the whole theory is to be gilded and dis- 
guised by a supposed moral obligation to uplift the relatively back- 
ward peoples and develop the relatively undeveloped lands — the 
theory of the white man's burden — it would seem an irresistible 
conclusion that force must continue to rule the world and that peace- 
ful civilization can go forward only under a dominant nation or 
under a balance of power between several dominant nations. 

I do not believe that this doctrine will indefinitely continue to con- 
trol politics and international relations. It is not morally sound. 
It is not economically sound. It is not even enlightened selfishness. 
It must and will disappear with the demonstration of its futility. 
This doctrine and civilization, as the masses of mankind are coming 
to conceive of civilization, are irreconcilably opposed. Force as a 
means of promoting economic interests or of advancing intellectual 
ideals is certain to diminish and to disappear, just as certainly as 
human slaverv and the imposition of theological or religious dogma 
by force have already disappeared. The rapidity of the process will 
depend chiefly, if not entirely, upon the progress of education and 
intelligence among the mass of mankind. If, therefore, we desire 
to reduce the chance of war, either because it is right for the world 
that it shall be reduced, or because we are thinking only of ourselves 
and wish to escape its horrors, if our desire is to prepare for peace, 
the surest w^ay to accomplish this result is, first, by seeing that our 
own national purposes and methods are not based upon tlie desire for 
economic expansion by means of political dominion or special privi- 
lege, or any sort of sphere of influence that discriminates in favor of 
our people as against those of any other nation; and secondly, by 
doing everything in oui' ]:iower to biing other nations to this same con- 
clusion, including active cooperation witl) other nations to produce 
this result. 

Our peace depends upon ourselves and upon the peace of the world; 
and one of the greatest steps toward the establishment of the world 
peace upon which our peace so largely depends is a sympathetic and 
effective cooperation between the Anglo-Saxon and the German and 
Scandinavian nations, to which Earl Grey has refen-ed as " nearest 
to us in mind and sentiment." 

We are told that at the end of the war our potential enemies will 
certainly be exhausted and unable or disinclined to take up a quarrel 
with us. I wish I could have the assurance upon this score that some 
of my fellow" pacifists entertain : but I can not forecast either our own 
wisdom or the degree of human emotion and human folly that will 
survive — that possibly may be born of— the greatest exhibition of 
human emotion and human folly that the world has ever seen. Our 
first duty, our most enlightened selfishness, is to do everything in our 
power now and at .the close of hostilities. to remove the causes of war, 
to create alternatives for war; but as we can not hope to remove every 
cause for war, as we can not be sure that effective alternatives for 
war will be devised or will be accepted, we have ourselves no sane 
alternative but to be prepared for effective defense. We have seen 
too clearly the realities of war to risk its coming or its consequences. 



10 pr?:parations fok peace. 

Our defense must be real or it will only add to our danger. Within 
the limits of what is strictly necessary for defense our preparation 
must be made as though it were certain to be needed. No fear that 
other nations will be led by our example to increase their armament 
unnecessarily can stand for one moment against the possibility of our 
need. What is incumbent upon us is to make it as clear as possible 
that the character and the extent of our military preparation are 
strictly defensive; indeed, our first inquiry should be into the possi- 
bilities of a military policy that will be on its face and in its essential 
characteristics defensive. 

With the greatest deference, and subject to correction by demon- 
stration and not by assertion, I venture to suggest that there is such 
a thing as a defensive military polic3^ which is essentially different 
in important particulars from an aggressive military policy, and that 
the plans for military and naval preparedness which are being pre- 
sented to lis either by the President and his political advisers, or 
by the General Board of the Navy, or the General Staff of the Army, 
do not recognize or apply the distinction. 

I am not discussing these things as an expert, nor do I assume that 
my audience is composed of experts. I am. however, not without the 
support of expert opinion, although it has not been allowed much 
public expression. And I assume that the great audience of our 
ordinary fellow citizens, as inexpert but as intensely and vitally con- 
cerned as we are, will in the end settle our military policy on sea 
and land, for this is necessarily the way of democracy. Admiral 
Mahan says : 

.Tustly api^iccijited. inilitiirx jiffiiirs iire one siilc of the politics of ;i nation and 
therefore concern the individual who l)as an interest in tlie liovernnient of the 
state. They form part of a <-losel.v relate<l whole, and imttin;;" aside the purely 
professional details * * * military i»i-eparations sh<mld he determined chiefly 
by those broad political considerations \\hich afYect the relations of states one 
to anotlier or of several part.s of the same state to the common defense. 

Eobert Wilden Neeser, whose book. Our Navy and the Next War, is 
an argument for greater naval strength, nevertheless says: 

In the last analysis it i.s the peojile who jiovern. it is the people who must be 
informed of their military condition. TIk' regulations wliich forbid military and 
naval men writinir for inihlication for the puri)ose of discussion .should be re- 
written. The freest discussion on all military and naval to])ics by officers of 
both services should be encouraged, such writiuirs to be slfjned by the authors, 
for which they would jissume the entire responsibility. When this privilege 
has been jiiven. then the peojtle will have a means of j,'ettinji at the truth and 
the authoi-ity in each case will lie known. By .sealiiiij: the liiis of those capable 
of Kivini;- the trtitli we have encoura.y:ed scarebead artich^s upon ()ur naval pre- 
paredness which carry little weii,dit and make no lasf'ni;- imjiression upon the 
minds of the people. 

Major-General Francis Vinton Greene has also called attention to 
the fact that Germany permits publicaticm of fi-ank discussions of 
military subjects — several thousand military books in a year as 
against several scores at the most in English-speaking countries. 

At all events. Avhether they like it or not, the exi)erts must convince 
us, untrained as we are. What we want and what we are entitled to 
have is candor and the fullest, freest opportunity for the expression 
of every sincere and intelligent judgment that has been or is being- 
formed within our military and naval service. We are dealing with 
what is alleged to be and what we believe is matter of life and death. 



PREPAEATIONS FOR PEACE. 11 

On such a matter the order prohibiting officers in our military estab- 
lishment from ntterino- and publishing opinions upon military pol- 
icy ^ seems especiall.y unwise and leaves the country altogether too 
dependent upon the officials or official boards (hat for the moment 
control the administration of our military and naval service. In 
that service jire experienced and serious students of the problems of 
military and naval policy whose views upon fundamentals and upon 
important details disagree Avith the views of both the military and 
the i^olitical heads of our military and naval establishments. These 
differences of opinion are not being given to the public. We are 
thus being led to the unwarranted conclusion that there is unanimity 
among our experts as to the kind and extent of military preparation 
we should have. 

I am a convinced advocate of securing and utilizing expert advice 
in the administration of public affairs. I have the highest regard 
jjnd respect for the officers in our naval and military service. I 
attach the greatest importance to their opinions with respect to the 
things that wall produce the most efficient military preparation for 
war and that Mill produce the greatest results in actual warfare. 
But what we are deciding is not the sort of an army or navy that 
W'ill be most powerful in war, but what sort of an army or navy will 
be most effective for securing peace. And that is a question which 
involves issues of national policy that are not exclusively military — 
in which, indeed, the military motive is of secondary importance. 

We must tell the Navy Board and the General Staff — not have 
them tell us — what it is we want an arm}' and a navy to do ; what are 
the purposes for which we wish to use an army and a navy. Then 
and then only can they tell us what kind of an army and navy will 
be best adapted for our purpose. Otherwise their opinions and esti- 
mates must necessarily be based on the assumption that Ave want a 
military establishment adequate to defend all our outstanding pos- 
sessions and obligations, and to maintain all our supposed national 
policies and interests, and in the event of war, in the language of the 
recent report of the War College, " to insure a successful termination 
of the Avar in the shortest time." 

All this may sound somcAvhat captious and theoretical, of little 
practical value, but I am not without knowledge that there exists 
among military experts — and in our oAvn military service — a recog- 
nition of the fact that there is a substantial difference betAveen a 
defensive and an offensive military policy and that it is not being 
recognized in the plans which are officially recommended for our mili- 
tary preparation. We are being urged to support a military program 
which we are assured is intended only for defense; but it is not an 
exclusively defensive program. I do not intend to impugn in any 
degree the sincerity of its advocates — I think they believe that they 
are advocating a defensive policy ; but they have not defined nor had 
defined for them what it is we Avish to defend, nor have they aban- 
doned that hoary maxim of military science that a strong offense is 
the best defense. 

1 " Officers! of the Army will refrain, until further orders, from giving out for publi- 
cation any interview, statement, discussion, or article on the military situation in the 
United States or abroad, as any expression of their views on this subject at present Is 
prejudicial to the l)est interests of the service." — War Department, Oeneral Order No. 10. 



12 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 

We shall make a serious mistake in all that we do toward military 
preparedness against war and for peace unless we tell our military 
experts, and tell them in a Avay that they will understand and accept, 
that we want a military establishment planned and prepared for de- 
fense and not for offense, even though offense may help defense — 
that we consciously and definitely intend to abandon and to have 
them abandon whatever military advantage there may be in having 
an army and a navy prepared to take the aggressive and to seek out 
and attack in force an enemy away from our own boundaries and 
waters. Only in this way can we convince the world that our object 
is pacific, that we are not merely repeating the hollow assurances 
of other nations that have built great navies and trained great armies 
in the name of peace only to use them for aggression when the op- 
portunity and the temptation came. Only in this way can we be sure 
that we shall not yield to temptation wdien it comes. AVhat is there 
in our national history to justify the claim that we will not use force 
to extend our boundaries or our dominion over the lands of weaker 
nations, no matter how sincerely at this time we intend not to do so? 
What right have we to thank God that we are not as other men, 
especially those Prussians? With an army and a navy designed for 
and substantially limited to the defense of our own lands and shores, 
we can with some confidence and effectiveness advocate those prin- 
ciples and agencies of international policy that are best adapted to 
reduce the chances of war. 

To illustrate what I have in mind, and not I alone, but others 
whose military experience and training give greater weight to their 
opinions, let me ask you Avhether it is not clear that a real substantial 
clarification of the Monroe Doctrine, adopting and extending the 
suggestions of President Wilson's message, would not in itself do 
more to make war against this country unlikely than all the increase 
we are likely to make in our army and our navy? We hear much of 
possible war wdth Japan. Should we not do more toward the pre- 
vention of such a war by discussing with Ja])an the issues sur- 
rounding Japanese immigration and the Open Door in China man 
fashion and in a way and with results that would do justice to our 
interests and to Japanese interests and to that self-respect which 
Japan has earned her right to entertain ? If we really intend to give 
national independence to the Philippines, should we not remove a 
great menace to our peace if Ave could secure international guar- 
anties of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Filipino 
nation? If we should open the Panama Canal to the warships of all 
nations under international guaranties of the safety of the Canal 
itself and of our peaceful ownership and operation of it, should we 
not make it a prize less likely to excite the cupidity of other nations 
and less likely to lead to war Avith us? If Ave did these things, 
should Ave not need an army and a navy quite different in character 
and size fi-om those Ave should need if Ave do not do them? Can Ave 
intelligently determine Avhat sort of an army and a navy Ave need 
without considering Avhat it is we propose to defend? If Ave retain 
all these possessions and interests and international policies, Avhere 
can Ave stop in our military ])rei)aration ? What folly to retain 
them if Ave do not propose to make serious and adequate preparation 
to defend them, and could not make really adequate preparation if 
Ave would. 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 13 

It may be said that these matters really make no difference in the 
sort of military preparation we ought to make — that it will require 
the same sort of an army and the same sort of a navy. to defend our 
own lands and Avaters that we should need to defend the Philippines 
and the Panama Canal and to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. No 
doubt some military authorities would make precisely this claim; 
but I venture to assert that excellent military authority is of quite 
a different opinion, and that it is supported by many considerations 
that appeal and should appeal to that great public which under our 
democratic government must and should decide the fundamental 
questions of policy directly involved. 

We are at least entitled to ask questions. If our navy is intended 
on4y to defend our own shores from invasion, could we not enor- 
mously increase the number of our submarines for the same money 
that it is proposed to spend on dreadnaughts; and Avould not the 
result give us a far more effective navy for purely defensive pur- 
poses^ Does not a single superdreadnaught cost as much as many 
submarines, depending on the types selected? If modern war — if 
this war — has taught us anything, it is that a navy of the dread- 
naught class is of little if any practical value against a stronger 
navy of the same sort. The weaker navy is inevitably bottled up. 
It dare not come out into the open unless it is prepared to risk all 
upon the result of its unequal contest with a stronger force. Unless 
we are prepared to enter the endless competition in naval expendi- 
ture, is not the navy of the era that ended with this war a waste of 
money and a self-deception as an efficient instrument of defense? 
Is not this confessed by the insistence of those who cling to this 
tj'pe of navy that the United States must increase its navy until 
it equals the navy of any other nation? Some say any other nation 
except England, either because they are appalled at competition in 
naval expenditure with England, whose existence as a world power 
depends upon predominance at sea, or because they think we should 
assume that war will never occur between England and the United 
States. Some insist that we must have a navy equal in aggressive 
strength to the combined navies of any two other nations except 
England; and that anything less than this will leave us without 
adequate protection for the very reasons that are given as underlying 
the dreadnaught naval theory. Has not this war demonstrated that 
a navy composed chiefly of great numbers of submarines, supple- 
mented by the torpedo boat, the destroyer, and the aeroplane, would 
be of immense defensive value against the most powerful dread- 
naught navy afloat? Is not a single submarine an effective fighting 
imit against any fleet, while a single dreadnaught is of practically 
no value Avhatever? Might not a few submarines encounter and 
destroy a mighty fleet, while a dreadnaught navy outclassed in 
strength by an invading squadron would lie impotent in the harbor? 
Are we not about to commit this nation to a program of dread- 
naughts that need yet more and more dreadnaughts to make them 
useful? Is it not wise to delay this program at least until we can 
know more than is now possible as to the place of the dreadiuiught 
in the future navies of the world? Secretary Daniels says that ex- 
pert opinion on this subject has undergone great fluctuations within 
the past few months. He has himself substantially increased the 
number of submarines for which the Navy Department is asking 



14 ' PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE, 

over the number recommended by the Navy Board. Why not spend 
our dreadnaught money, at least for the present, on submarines and 
other defensive agencies? Even Neeser asks the question: "With 
the offensive submarine now a certainty, should we continue to 
build battleships?" And his answer is an evasion and is also based 
upon the premise that " the ultimate aim of war is to command the 
sea." Having already called the offensive submarine "a certainty," 
lie says: "The new cruising submarine, if a success, may become a 
serious menace to a battleship fleet; but it does not seem a sufficient 
menace to stop the construction of those ships which have so long 
and in the face of all challengers held command of the sea." 

But it may be said that such a navy as I am discussing could not bo 
used so effectively as the dreadnaught in foreign waters away from*its 
base. Precisely so; and is not this one of its chief advantages to us? 
Could we do anything that would so effectively stamp our military 
polic}'^ as intended only for defense as to create a navy that, while 
powerful for defense would by its very character have less power for 
aggression? If we wish only to defend ourselves, do we need any 
other navy? Can we do anything that will so completely convince 
the world that we mean what we say when we declare that we are 
arming only for peace? Can we do am^thing that will so increase our 
poAver to influence other nations to adopt the policies and the agencies 
that make for peace? Even if we had to concede that a defensive 
navj'^ would lack some of the aggressive power that we might desire 
in actual warfare, can we not well afford to make this sacrifice for the 
immense gain in making war less likely to occur? 

Is it not a choice betw^een this policy and the race for naval suprem- 
acy which alone will enable us "to command the sea"? Norman 
Angell may be urging some propositions about which there may well 
be difference of opinion, but he has at least convincingly demon- 
strated one fallacy : 

Mr. Churchill lays it clown as an axiom that the way to be sure of peace is to 
be so much stronger than your enemy that he dare not attack you. One wonders 
if the Germans will take his advice. It amounts to this : Hei-e are two likely to 
quarrel; how shall they keep the peace? Let each l)e stronger than the ot'hej", 
and all will be well. This " axiom " is, of course, a physical al)surdity. On this 
basis there is no such thing as adequate defense for either. If one party to the 
dispute is safe, the other is not, and is entitled to try and make itself so. 

Is there not a distinctively defensive policy applicable to the army 
just as to the navy? The arguments for increased land forces and 
reserves seem entirely sound. But this does not relieve us — even us 
laymen — from the necessity of considering what they should be and 
how they should be obtained. I do not propose to discuss details of 
military organization. It is important, however, for the public to 
understand that there are differences of opinion and of interest in 
the army as to what branches of the service should be increased. I 
am expressing no opinion, except that there should be complete free- 
dom in the service for the public discussion of the issues. 

All the military opinion about which I know anything is agreed 
that for a defensive policy we need trained officers, trained infantry, 
trained artillery, adequate equipment, and both an adequate supply 
of munitions and provision for increasing and maintaining an ade- 
quate supply of the things for which modern war makes such insa- 
tiate demands. Does the program of preparedness that has been pre- 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 15 

pared for us contemplate these things? We are tokl that our prepa- 
ration must be a genuine and a serious thing, that at tlie close of this 
war some victorious nation or combination of nations may decide to 
use its trained and veteran troops against us in resentment, or envy 
or lust of power or hope of loot, and that we must be ready and re- 
main ready, that Ave must keep our powder dry. We are told that 
only thorough training and the verj' best equipment for an army in the 
leash would avail for our defense. And how is it proposed to secure 
such an army? Make a small increase in our regular troops and give 
a citizen soldiery annually a feAV months' intensive training that will 
not interfere too seriously Avith their business and professional occu- 
pations. Is there then no serious need for preparing against the 
possibility of a real invasion? 

The truth is that at and for some time after the close of this Avar 
the United States may be in less danger from attack than at any time 
in its history. We all hope Avith differing degrees of confidence that 
out of the horrors and destruction of this war Avill come a real ad- 
vance toward some form of international relations and international 
arrangements that Avill reduce the burdens of armament and the 
probabilities of war. If our hopes Avere really more than hopes, this 
nation might well aAvait the outcome Avithout increasing at this 
time its military establishment — not that we might not then take Avise 
precautions to meet the actual situation that Avill then be disclosed, 
but that we could be so much wiser then than Ave possibly can be 
now. It is because our hopes are only hopes, and not certainties, 
that we are urged to prepare noAv against a possibility that might be 
so unspeakably disastrous to this country, to its men, and especially 
to its Avomen and its children, that we are not justified in delaying at 
least adequate preparation to resist attack. But if Ave are really to 
prepare against a real attack, wdiat folly it is to be less than ade- 
quately prepared. We should analyze the situation that is at all 
likely to confront us and meet that situation. What is the situation ? 

It seems clear that we need anticipate no attack from Great 
Britain or indeed from any of her allies for some time after this 
war, no matter Avhat its outcome, unless Ave ourselves furnish some 
new and gratuitous occasion for a quarrel. For a hundred years we 
have settled amicably every issue Avith Great Britain, and many of 
the issues have been peculiarly irritating and important to both na- 
tions. Our substantive i-elations w^ere never more sympathetically 
friendly, and new causes Avould have to arise to strain them. Our 
diplomatic relations were never so assured by treaties providing for 
the peaceful settlement of issues upon which we may disagree. Cer- 
tainly this is true of Great Britain; and with her friendship and 
the already increased and growing appreciation of the reality and 
value of the Anglo-Saxon tie, a Avar betw^een the tAvo great Anglo- 
Saxon nations is practically unthinkable. I mention Great Britain 
because it seems not Avorth while to discuss the effect of our prox- 
imity to Canada in the event of Avar. Canada is probably a hostage 
in our reach against Avar Avith England; but let us assume that it 
Avould be a military asset for Great Britain. No other first-class 
power except England has any foothold in North America from 
Avhich land forces could be drawn or in Avhich they could be landed. 
Any other formidable enemy Avould be compelled to transport its 



16 PREPAEATIONS FOR PEACE. 

invading army across the ocean. I have had no opportunity to 
examine or to discuss with military officers in whose judgment I 
have confidence the recent report of the War College Division of the 
General Staff. We are all, however, entitled to question its sound- 
ness or its availability, as the President and the Secretary of War 
have questioned them. They are civilians like ourselves. 

General Greene, however, has discussed at some length the prob- 
lems presented to us in the event of such invasion and has advised 
us of the conclusions of such military students as Freiherr von 
Edelsheim in the service of the German General Staff. His con- 
clusion is that our initial problem would be to prevent the landing, 
or to defeat after it landed, a force of 240,000 infantry with the 
ordinary normal complement of cavalry, artillery, stores, etc., and 
that this is the largest force that it would be practicable to transport 
to our shores as a single expedition. The War College now makes a 
larger estimate. Germany has permitted the public discussion of 
military problems of this sort. We have refused or restricted it. 
The weight of availaljle military authority, however, seems agreed 
that we should have 500,000 trained soldiers to meet an invasion, 
and that this number of really trained men adequately equipped 
would successfully repel the invasion. It may be that, considering 
the disadvantages attending disembarkation, substantially less than 
this number would suffice for effective defense, provided they are 
trained soldiers, and not half-trained militia or national guardsmen. 
I speak in no terms of disrespect of our militia — quite the contrary. 
I merely insist upon the fact, recognized by the intelligent militia 
officers themselves, that men in active civil life who give all the time 
they can to military training can not successfully oppose regular 
troops. The militia can quickly become an army, but it can not be 
an army; and what we should need if an invasion threatened us 
would be an army. Then let us have an army — no larger than we 
need for the purpose of manning our defenses and repelling an in- 
vasion, but a real army of real soldiers adequate for this purpose 
and a militia adequate to fill the ranks as they need filling. I do not 
say 500,000 men ; I say what number we need for the defensive pur- 
pose which we intend to accomplish. 

The suggestion of universal military service in this country can be 
intelligently determined only by considering separately each of the 
objects for which it is alleged to be desirable. Its main — its real — 
purpose is military. If it is not necessary or at least desirable for 
strictly military purposes, it will never be adopted because of its 
alleged pliysical or disciplinary benefits. And for what conceivable 
purpose of military defense should we train to arms millions of the 
3'^oung men of the United States? From a military point of view 
this surely would be a senseless waste of time, energy, and money. If 
w^e are to have an army, let us have a real army, trained and efficient 
for its purpose. Let us have no superficial training of millions of 
schoolboys, no amateurish conscription of the adult manhood of the 
nation, creating a paper force immensely greater than any possible 
need for any purjiose that we ought to entertain, only to demonstrate 
its inefficiency if a test of strength should come, to disseminate 
through the nation a false feeling of security, and to encourage the 
natural tendency toward brag and bluster to which Brother Jonathan 
has been unfortunately susceptible. 



PEEPAKATIONS FOR PEACE. 17 

There is undoubtedly a strong feeling in the United States that, no 
matter what we should do in the way of military preparation, we 
should be in no danger of imperialistic ambition or that aggressive 
militarism which precisely the same policy has undoubtedly tended 
to create elsewhere. There is far greater clanger from these sources 
than our people realize. This false assumption of a superior resist- 
ing power of Americans to the allurements of imperialism and 
national expansion only makes the danger more real. Human nature 
is essentially the same "in Prussia and in the United States. 

It is not in Germany alone that the Nietzschean exaltation of the 
Will to Power stirs the atavistic savage that lingers in most of us 
and in some of us to an exceptional degree. Few Americans may 
believe that war is a biological necessity, but many are easily per- 
suaded that it is a necessity on other grounds, and its exhibition of 
primitive virtues and barbarian vigor distracts attention from its 
hideous cruelties and its senseless waste. We need to be constantly 
reminded that mankind is not degenerating because it is finding less 
use for some superb qualities of the animal and the savage, that 
evolution is out of the jungle, not back into it. 

If German blood or German training makes men more prone to 
exalt force in international affairs, it will be well for us to remember 
that in 1910 there were in the United States 8,282,618 people wdio 
were born in Germany, or one or both of whose parents were born 
in that country. This takes no account of more than 2,000,000 of 
our population similarly derived from Austria. 

If the United States is to have increased military forces — and it 
seems essential that we shall — let us not be blind to the dangers that 
are inseparable from military training and military strength. Let 
us endure with patience the taunts of the militant pacifist whose 
motto is " Speak softly and carry a big stick." I try sometimes to 
visualize that peace-loving and peace-seeking community in which 
that motto is carried into practical effect, as its distinguished author 
illustrates it in his own delightful way. Picture to yourselves the 
citizens of Chicago leaving their homes in the morning, each armed 
with a big stick, suited to his taste — one with beautifully polished 
knobs on the heavy end of the stick and one with nails carefully dis- 
posed upon its surface, to emphasize the value of the weapon as a 
deterrent of force and an incentive to peace — each swinging his little 
pacifier jauntily as he trudges sturdily or saunters leisurely along, 
speaking softly to those he passes about mollycoddles, cowards, and 
the Ananias Club. How certain it would be that no thought of 
violence would disturb the peaceful serenity of such a happy com- 
munity. It is an excellent motto, but hard to live up to, and we shall 
do well not to underestimate the difficulty. Nations, like individuals, 
when they carry big sticks, seem predisposed to raise their voices. 

It is said that the disbandment of our armies after the Civil War 
demonstrates that military training will not create a militaristic 
sentiment in the United States, but it is not from those who have had 
actual experience in war and have gone through the pit of hell, or at 
least looked into its mouth, that we need fear militaristic sentiment 
so much as from the man who has merely worn the trappings and 
studied the manual of arms. It is the little knowledge that is the 
dangerous thing. 

S. Doc. 323, 64-1 2 



18 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 

Has consideration been given to the political dangers of an organ- 
ized citizen soldier}' containing millions of men, who would not 
regard the military work seriously because war would not really 
seem imminent? 

The suggestion of a new sort of army — a continental army — -is 
obviously due to the desire to meet the difficulty of putting the 
militia under direct Federal control, for it i)roposes nothing but a 
partially trained force of volunteers. Does it not seem far wiser to 
extend Federal support to the militia upon condition that the train- 
ing shall compl}^ with Federal requirements? 

Has not Scharnhorst shown us our true military policy, w^hen by 
transferring every man to the reserve as soon as he had been trained, 
the active army of 42.000 men, to which he was restricted b}' the 
Peace of Paris, became the army of 150.000 that contributed so 
powerfully to the defeat of Napoleon? Why should we not adopt 
the polic}' of training our soldiers as intensively as possible and then 
transfer them, as soon as they are trained, to a reserve i-eceiA'ing 
proper pay from the Government and subject to be called to the 
colors whenever needed? Would not such a plan give us a vastly 
superior army to that available in any other way? Would it be any 
less a citizen soldiery because it had one year's continuous training 
instead of three months' training for each of four years? Woidd 
not the interference Avith business or professioijal activity be far less 
and the cost to the country far less than under the plans proposed i 

If some mechanical training accompanied tlie military training, 
it might extend the period of active service, but might it not equip 
the soldier for a more useful citizenship and make enlistment more 
attractive? The same thought applies to the education of the reserve 
of trained officers that should be provided. 

Universal military service would undoubtedly distribute the mili- 
tary burden, but it would create the burden for the sake of distribut- 
ing it. It is not "' shirking " to oppose the imposition on our people 
of a burden which it is both unnecessary and unwise for them to 
assume. By nuiking service in the army and in the militia of real 
value to those who enlist, as Avell as to the nation, we should create a 
military s,ystem that would justify itself, and that would secure forces 
amply sufficient for our defense. There should be no illusicm as 
to the effect — if not the purpose — of doing more than this. Our 
■sons, once trained, would be available for war beyond our borders, 
and even statutory declarations against using them there would not 
remove the ccmsequences of their availability.' 

It may well be questioned whether the agitation for uui\ersal mili- 
tary training or any other form of ('onscripti(Ui does not tend to dis- 
credit and to prevent a degree of actual military preparation which 
might otherwise receive popular support. 

It is said that what we lack in the United States is discipline, and 
that military discipline will supply the need. We do want civic 



1 On .Tanuary 4, 1016, the Associated Press sent out from Washington a dispatch for 
which it claimed exceptionally reliable information, stating that : " a navy equal in 
strengtli fo those of any two world powers except Great Britain, and an army prepared 
to fight for the integrity of the Pan-American idea anywhere in Pan-America is the ulti- 
mate aim of the plans of the military experts." 

On .January ti. 1016. Secretary Garrison said before the Military Committee of the 
House of Representatives : " We have determined and announced that tlie sovereignty of 
the other republics of tliis hemisphere shall remain inviolable and must therefore at all 
times stand ready to make good our |)osition in this connecticm." 



PKKI'ARATIONS FOR PEACE. 19 

discipline, the conscious and willing subordination of iuuuediate in- 
dividual freedom of action to concerted and cooperative control for 
the good of the comnumity, a control in determining the extent and 
character and purpose of which the disciplined shall have a voice. 
Shall we get this from a training that consists chietiy if not wholly 
in obedience to orders? No military discipline in or out of the 
schools can be made much more than this for the great mass under 
the practical limitations that must prevail. Few, indeed, will be the 
individuals Avho will be trained to direct others, and these few will 
learn chiefl}' to direct the others in a routine essentially arbitrary 
and mechiinical. 

Theirs iiol to reason wli.v. 

Tlieirs but to do and die, 

is the ideal of military discipline, the quality we are called upon to 
praise and admire in the soldier. It is an admirable ideal for mili- 
tary piu-poses, but not so good for civic purposes, and what Ave are 
now discussing is the alleged civic advantage of military discipline 
upon the young manhood of the country. 

As to the suggestion that military drill in the public schools would 
be justified on the ground of physical development. President Lowell, 
of Harvard, says that his experience on the Boston School Hoard 
convinced him that military drill in the public schools is a mistake: 
that the boys tired of drill, and were disinclined later to join the 
militia. He thinks other kinds of physical training are better, and 
that while his objection does not apply to colleges, drill should be a 
very small part of military training. 

Former President Elliot says: 

I feel strongly anotiier objection to military drill in secondary scliools, namely, 
tbat it fiives no {)reiiaration whatever for the real work of a soldier. In the 
Boston High Schools military drill includes nothing but the manual of arms, 
company movements on even surfaces, and a few very simple battalion move- 
ments, mostly those of parade. The real work of a soldier is to dig in the 
ground with pick and shovel ; to carry a burden of about tifty pounds on long 
marches; to run very sliort distances carrying a similar bunien : and to shoot 
accurately with a rille; throw hand grenades; and use rapidly and v/ell machine 
guns and artillery. IMilitary drill in schools has no tendency to prepare boys 
to do the real work of a soldier. The Swiss do not begin to train their young 
men for their army until they are about twenty years of age. except that they 
(Micourage voluntary ritle clubs for i)rac1ice in sjiooting. 

Assuming, however, that there would be both physical and dis- 
ciplinary advantages in military training, it would not follow that 
we should obtain these advantages by compulsory military service. 

It is said that military training would increase res]>ect for law 
and order, and the proof of this is said to be the comparative sta- 
tistics of ci-imes of A'iolence in Switzerland and the United States. 
HoAv about the comparative respect for law in England and in the 
Ignited States, although E^ngland has not adojjted universal military 
training ? 

If Ave were situated as is Switzerland, where any war or serious 
threat of Avar is certain to require the military service of every able- 
bodied citizen, and Avliere, even then, every unit in the small popula- 
tion nnist have the very highest military efficiency ])racticable. Ave 
might justify universal military training, in and out of the scliools. 
We may be sure that any attemi)t Avith us to train a citizen soldiery 



20 PEEPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 

under the Swiss system would almost certainly be perfunctory, be- 
cause it would not be taken seriously. We must never forget that the 
discipline which German}'' has given her citizens is a discipline which 
is not confined to their service in the army. The German people are 
trained to regard the state as the instrumentality through and by 
Avhich they — each of them individually and all of them collectively— 
can best advance their interests — can best secure for themselves the 
necessities and the pleasures of life. Behind even the verboten is a 
larger consciousness of the advantages of communal action, a Lirger 
practical realization of those advantages, than obtains in any other 
great nation to-day. 

Germany's industrial and social progress has been attained in spite 
of, and not because of, her system of enforced military training and 
service. Undoubtedly the conviction which has existed in Germany 
that Avar was a real and constantly impending probability has had an 
influence, perhaps a determining influence, in securing the adoption 
of certain policies, such as the government ownership and operation 
of railroads, and the development of waterways in connection with 
the railroads as a "coordinated" and interdependent transportation 
system. The same conviction of the imminence of war has perhaps 
had its influence in securing some of the social and industrial legis- 
lation which sound views of public policy justify and demand w^ith- 
out the slightest regard to their military value. There is no evidence, 
however, that these social and industrial results in Germany were 
due to the military training of German citizens. Prussia is not the 
portion of the German Empire in wiiich we find the most inspiring 
examples of peaceful progress. Again I find Paid Rohrback instruc- 
tive when he points out the antagonism of " the material provincial- 
ism of the small state and the old individualism of the German races, 
Avhich in this case has been hardened and quickened by the long 
political separation." He says: 

But we Germans of the ICiuiiiiv (>i-i- if \v(> lliink rliat this exphinatiou settles- 
the question. An equal share of the responsibility for the existin.^ estran.wmont 
'should he hiid at the door (rf the North German element, which has trained 
he.i?emony in the new Empire, and which shows its iiu'.hility to aeliieve in the 
woi'ld what one may call mor.al conquests. The shoiisishted inflexibility of the 
North German, and most especially of the I'russian ('hara<-ter, which can pro- 
duce i^rent tlnn.trs only anionjz; its own peoiile, is easily exi>lained by the course 
oi its history. It deserves Ki'eat. and perliaps even the .sole, credit for the 
arowth of I'russin to the state of u woi-ld powei-, and theref{>re. indirectly, 
for the union of the greater number of integral parts of the old Empire intf> 
the new Empire. Nevertheless, this .special side of the Prussian character i.'? 
developing; more and more into an actual source of danirer for our national 
future, especially in its modern inipleasant variations. 

No; German social and industrial progi-ess is not due to military 
training, but, as Paul Rohrback says, to Germany industry, and to 
the fact that Germany has made more progress toward having her 
government perform the true functions of government in its internal 
and peaceful relations to its citizens than has been made by other 
governments, especially our own. I^nless our preparation is not only 
planned for defense, and is, as far as practicable, unadapted for 
aggression, the preparation itself Mill add to the possibilities of war, 
because we shall be less afraid of the consequences of mistake and 
less on our guard against those who from ignorance or self-interest 
seek to persuade us to maintain unsound national ideals or purposes. 



I'KKPAKATlOxNS FOIt PEACE. 21 

Other nations may, of conisc, make the same sort of mistake; may 
permit themselves to assert against lis interests that are not their true 
interests or that they have no right to assert. We may have to defend 
ourselves against aggression born of their mistakes, but so far as 
actual war is concerned Ave are in far less danger from the selfishness 
or muddled thinking of other nations than we are from the selfishness 
or muddled thinking of our own people. We are defended, not only 
by our geographical separation from Europe and Asia, but by the 
character of our country itself, its extent and physical conformation, 
and. more than all this, by the conflicting interests of our possible 
enemies. The balance of power in Europe has always been more of 
a defense to us than even our isolation. The conquest of the United 
States has been impossible — the attempt unthinkable — except by land 
and naval forces too large to be spared from Europe. It was largely 
because of this condition that we succeeded in the war of the Revo- 
lution, and got off with a little humiliation in 1812. Only the 
creation in Europe as a result of this war of new conditions in which 
one or other of the contending parties is left so completely crushed 
as to destroy all fear from that nation in the mind of the victor or 
victors can possibly threaten us, and then the victor must have some 
motive, must see some advantage, in making war upon us. 

No European nation can have any real motive to attack the United 
States except to prevent us from asserting claims or exercising rights 
in other countries which are not in accordance with its interests. 
There can be no motive of conquest, and it is equally unthinkable that 
any European nation would make war on us to impose discrimina- 
tory commercial or political conditions upon us, or merely to punish 
us or to loot us or force from us a money payment as the price of 
peace. Theoretically, any of these things might happen ; practically 
they can be dismissed from serious consideration. 

If the United States becomes involved in war it will be because it 
asserts some right or claims some privilege outside of its own terri- 
tory, the assertion of Avhich right or privilege runs counter to the 
interests of some foreign pow^er, or it will be because some foreign 
power asserts a similar right or privilege against us. We can not 
of ourselves control the motives or the actions of other poAvers 
except by international agreement, backed by force or by measures 
short of force which may be equally effective for the purpose. Our 
first concern, however, is v^ith our own attitude toward these matters. 
What are the rights or privileges we claim or wish to claim outside 
of our own territory ? Are we claiming or are we likely to claim any 
rights or privileges that are likely to be challenged by other nations? 
What are the foundations for such claims? Are they sound in 
principle and in law? How^ important to us is their assertion if 
challenged? Are they important enough to fight for? Are there 
other remedies than war available to us if they are challenged? 
What are they? Is our claim similar in character to that of other 
nations, and should we take steps to unite all nations w'ho are in- 
terested in the same essential claims for its defense against a possible 
aggressor? Should we unite North and South America in the de- 
fense of our common interests, and if this seems desirable, why 
should we draw^ an artificial line excluding agreements with Euro- 
pean nations in matters where our common interests are as clear as, 
or clearer than, our Pan American interests? 



22 PEEPAEATIONS FOR PEACE. 

To reach right answers to these questions we must above all clear 
our minds of the false doctrine that enduring economic interests can 
be promoted by force. TTndoubtedly temporary advantages can be 
secured by the exploitation of other nations, especially — perhaps 
exclusively — undeveloped peoples and undevelojied lands; but in the 
long run the commercial interests of the world are mutual. Our 
pros])erity is dependent u])on ])rosperity elsewhere. Every nation 
obtains materials or goods from others and sells to others its own 
surplus of materials or goods. Every nation has most to gain by 
helping to advance the trade of the world ; to make all nations pros- 
perous while fostering its own commerce by every means consistent 
with sound economic laws. So far as the happiness of the mass of 
mankind or of the masses of any particular nation is concerned the 
adjustment of world commerce to the natural laws of commerce 
wholly overbalances the temporary advantages of exploitation. Oth- 
erwise it would be to the economic interest of this nation to encour- 
age the continuation of the Avar in Europe so that we might continue 
our artificial trade in munitions. We ov^^e much to Norman Angell 
for his convincing presentation in effective popular form of the 
economic fallacy that world commerce follows national lines and 
that im]5erialism is commercially profitable. 

The imperialistic theory is built upon the history of the British 
Empire and upon a misunderstanding of that history, especiallj^ 
upon a failure to comprehend that economic conditions are now so 
radically and irrevocablv different that the British Empire itself 
is commercially and politically revolutionized. The history of Eng- 
land can not be repeated any more than can the history of Rome, 
and wise men would not desire to repeat either if they could. We 
can not ignore the ]')rocess by wdiich the world has been convinced 
that the Avelfare of the mass of the people is the real test of national 
success. Privilege may gain from exploitation, but not democracy: 
and democracy has come to stay as the economic, social, and intel- 
lectual ideal of civilization even more tlian as a political ideal. This 
will be clearer to mankind after this war. and we mav suspect that 
it is becoming clearer and clearer during the war. Right now in the 
trenches no i:>ower can keep the soldier from thinking and thinking 
about the state and his relation to it. Even if he is led to macnif'.' 
the value of organization and efficiency, he intends to ask for organi- 
zation and efficiency in his interest and not in the interests of privi- 
lege or class. 

The very first thing that we Americans should consider to-day is 
the relation which we wish our Government to assume tovrard us as 
individuals and toward other nations. Our whole attitude toward 
this war and its results dej^ends upon our conception of tlie function 
of the state. What are our ideals of the individual life and of com- 
munitv life? Do we conceive that the most desirable life for. our- 
selves — for individual men — is the life in which there is the least 
possible restraint upon individual freedom of action, not only the 
action of each man in those thinfrs that concern him alone — if. in- 
deed, there are any such things — Imt also in those things that affect 
others, leaving the result of the conflict ])etween individuals to be 
decided by the relative strength or cunning of the individu.al ? There 
are those who, consciously or otherwise, really desire a world in 
Avhicli the strong, the astute, the .intellectually and physically su- 



I'RKPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 23 

perior are to iune the fullest freedom to enjoy eveiy advantage 
which they can ol)tain over their inferiors. If they are shrewder, if 
more farseeing, if they are stronger, more vigorous physical^ and 
intellectually, they contend that it is their right to anticipate those 
who are less alert, less farseeing, less cunning, in seizing the things 
or the ]:>ositions that are available, and that, having seized them, it is 
their vested right to hold them. e\en when it Iiecomes clear that these 
things and these ])oints of vantage are essential to the community as 
a Avliole and to the general mass of mankind. Men who hold this 
\iew regard it as a merit, as a demonstration of worth, that they fore- 
saw Avhat some day the community would need, some natural re- 
source, some particular piece of property, the potential value of 
Avhich Avas not generally ap])reciated at the time, and that they ac- 
quired it so that in the day of need they could profit from the needs 
of their fellows. We shall have to get rid of this idea in our indi- 
vidual and national life if Ave are to get rid of the most prolific source 
of war in the field of international relations. 

Let us not confuse creatiAe industry Avith mere shreAvdness or fore- 
sight or superior mental or physical capacity. Superiority of this 
kind should have no rcAvard for itself, but only for its exercise for 
the benefit of others, for the connnunity as a Avfiole. AVhen it con- 
fines itself to forecasting the future and seizing now^ those things 
that are to be valuable hereafter it has no real claim to the grati- 
tude or the respect of others. It has added nothing to the Avealth or 
the Avelfare of mankind. It may be difficult to draAv the line, but it 
is none the less certain that there is a line of distinction betAveen 
creative and predatory Avealth: and the duty of the community is 
to clraAv the line as rapidly as it can discern Avhere it really lies and 
to approximate it eAen Avhen its exact location is not entirely clear. 
It is the business of the community to protect community interests 
and to promote community Avelfare. If there is anything clear in 
our philosophy or our history it is that civilization is deA'eloping in 
this direction : 

With thousanrl shocks that come and jio. 
With agonies, with energies, 
Witli overthrowings, an(l AA'ith crie.s, 

And undulations to and fro. 

We knoAv noAv that success in Avar depends, after the first shock, 
on social and indu.strial solidarity far more than upon the nmnber of 
trained soldiers that can be placed in the field. It is easier to enlist 
men and to train them if the front can be held for a time — in our 
case if the first invading expedition can be held off or seriously crip- 
pled — than it is to organize the national economic and industrial 
forces to support the troops if they are to be successful under the 
conditions of modern Avarfare. In his annual message of December 
7 President Wilson emphasized our dut}'^ in this regard : 

While we speak of the pi-ejiaration of the Nation to make sure of lier security 
and lier effective power we nnist not faU into the patent error of supjiosing tliat 
lier r«^al strengtli comos from armaments and mere saf(>guards of written law. 
It comes, of course, from her people, their energy, their success in their under- 
takings, their free oiii)ortunity to use the natur;>,l rp'<f>urces of our gr(>at liome- 
land and of tlie lands outside our continental bonh-rs which loolv to us for pro- 
tection, for encouragement, and for assistance in their devehipment. from the 
organization and freedom and vitality of our economic life. 

The domestic questions which engaged the attention of the last Congress are 
more A'ital to the Nation in this its time of test than at any other time. We can 



24 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE, 

not adequately make ready for any trial of our streugh unless we wisely and 
promptly direct tlie force of our laws into- these all-important fields of domestic 
action. 

He then proceeds to select one pressing economic problem to which 
to direct particular attention. He says : 

In the meantime may I make this suggestion? The transportation prohlem is 
an exceedingly serious and pressing one in this country. There has from time 
to time of late been reason to fear that our railroads would not much longer be 
able to cope with it successfully as at present equipped and coordinated. I 
suggest that it would be wi.se to provide for a commissh)n of inquiry to ascer- 
ttiin by a thorough canvass of the whole question v.iiether our laws as at pres- 
ent framed and administered are as serviceable as they might be in the solu- 
tion of the problem. It is obviously a problem that lies at the very foundation 
of our efficiency as a people. Such an inquiry ought to draw out every circum- 
stance and opinion worth considering, and we need to know all sides of the 
matter if we mean to do anything in the field of Federal legislation. 

The issue thus raised will be found to go far deeper than mere 
changes in " the process of regulation." No lesson of the war has 
been more clearly taught than that efficient transportation is of the 
very essence of military efficiency and strength. It is equally true, 
as President Wilson says, that the transportation problem in peace 
" lies at the very foundation of our efficiency as a people." Our pres- 
ent method of dealing with it is increasingly unsatisfactory to the 
private interests involved, and it is not satisfactory to the public. 
We have secured many improvements by adopting public regulation, 
but as this regulation proceeds it becomes more and more api)arent 
that the transportation system of the country is essentially one inter- 
related and interdependent whole. There may always be a rivalry 
in economy and efficiency of service, but competition for traffic is 
moderated by a division of territory, or a gentlemen's agreement, 
while competition in rates has almost disappeared. 

Governmental regulation has served to bring out clearly the essen- 
tially monopolistic character of our railroad system as a whole and 
the necessity of that " coordination " to which President Wilson re- 
fers. The question is whether coordination in the public service can 
be obtained so long as our railroads do not have a common financial 
interest as among themselves, but onl}^ a common financial interest 
as against the public. Can a public service which is essentially 
monopolistic be satisfactorily performed as a competitive enter- 
prise ? Are we not losing the benefits of competition without obtain- 
ing the advantages of regulated monopoly? We are certainly irri- 
tating and discouraging private enterprise based on competitive 
profits. So unsatisfactorily is the result that some of our leading 
railroad officials regard public ownership as the only escape from 
what the}^ consider destructive regulation. The question is whether 
" coordination " can be obtained without public ownership. 

Germany has owned and operated her railroads, from the point of 
view of public service, in peace and in war, not from the point of 
view of profits, although the profits have been large. The probabili- 
ties seem to be that after the close of this war every railroad in 
Europe will be nationalized. Military reasons may be the determin- 
ing factors in this result, but it may well be questioned whether any 
satisfactory solution of the transportation problem can be reached 
in any other way. AVhether our government should take over our 
railroads and when and upon what conditions may raise many ques- 
tions of expediency, but if we are to treat the issue with open mind 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 25 

it is important that \Ye should understand that if, in the public 
interest, the government should do so, it will not be invading the 
domain of private enterprise, but will merel}^ be taking back to itself 
a function of government which, for what seemed sulKcient reasons 
of expediency, it had previously delegated to private agencies. 

I take it we shall all agree that if there is something Avhich it is the 
true function of government to perform, that thing will never be per- 
formed as it should be until the government performs it. We may 
disagree about what is the true function of government, but once it is 
determined that on principle the performance of a particular service 
is a function of government, that means, if it means anything, that 
under right conditions of government it will be better. performed by 
the government than if left to pinvate enterprise. If a government is 
not performing all of the functions of government it is to that extent 
a failure as a government. The results must continue to be less satis- 
factory and less efficient than they should be and can be if the gov- 
ernment is performing all of its functions, is qualified to perform 
them, and is performing them properly. Now, nothing is more 
clearly settled in the law of this country and in the principles upon 
which that law is based than that railroads as common carriers are 
performing a function of government. The Supreme Court of the 
United States and many other courts have so held. (See United 
States V. Joint Tariff Association, 171 U. S., 605, 570; Talcott v. 
Pine Grove, 23 Federal Cases, 652, etc.) Indeed, the construction 
and control of the public highway is historically and on principle 
one of the first of the functions of government, and a railroad is a 
public highway. My purpose in discussing this matter has been to 
indicate how deep the issues of industrial mobilization go. In Eng- 
land it already in\-olves the relations of the trade unions to the 
government. 

Ifc is insisted b)^ some that the abolition of war or even its sub- 
stantial diminution is an idle dream; that we may be reasonably cer- 
tain that for one reason or another this country, will be involved in 
war within a comparatively short time. Very well. It is now clear 
that industrial mobilization is as essential to modern war as is mili- 
tary mobilization, and such mobilization can not be effectively made 
after hostilities occur unless the government already has the powers 
and is exercising the acti^■ities essential to effective mobilization. It 
is even more difficult to agree upon the principles and to create the 
machinery for industrial mobilization than for military mobilization, 
and lack of actual experience in applying the principles and operat- 
ing the machinery may be disastrous in the one case as in the other. 
Do the prophets of war propose to face now the problems of eco- 
nomic and industrial mobilization? If they do it will be necessary 
to abandon some dogmatic assumptions which have heretofore 
formed and still form so large a part of our political thinking. 

One of the most significant things in the development of all 
modern thought has been the decline in the acceptance of dogma. 
Outside of the exact sciences, like mathematics, we have learned to 
look with suspicion and distrust on dogmatic statement of laws or 
principles. William G. Sumner says: "If you want war, nourish a 
doctrine. Doctrines are the most frightful tyrants to which men ever 
are subject, because doctrines get inside of a man's own reason and 
betray him against himself." Consciously and unconsciously, the 



26 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 

pragmatic philosophy is succeeding the dogmatic in science as it is 
in theology. Experiment is succeeding assumption as the sure 
foundation of human j^rogress. In no field is this so important as 
in the field of political and social science — of nothing is it so true as 
of government. In the United States we have been particularly in 
danger of dogmatic error because of the wide acceptance of the 
proposition that that government is best which governs least, a dog- 
matic principle as vicious and unsound as the opposite dogma upon 
which socialism is based: for the dogma that the state should directly 
cover the whole field of human industry is equally fallacious. The 
truth, as usual, lies l)etween. Government is not best when it gov- 
erns least, nor is it best when it governs most. (Tovernmoni is best 
when it is doing well whatever will promote the welfare of the com- 
munity most if done by the community than if left to be done by 
part of the community. And .yet, progress is unquestionably in the 
direction of the extension of governmental activities into fields 
heretofore left to private enterprise, and we must be open minded 
toward further movement in that direction. Germany is strong to- 
day in war, not <mly because she is prepared for war, but because 
she has gone further than other nations in the assumption bv her 
government of those social and industrial responsibilities which gov- 
ernment should assume whenever it is apparent that, by so doing, 
the welfare of the nation — the greatest good to the greatest number — 
will be promoted. She has not accepted socialism, but she has been 
hampered by no dogma that the state must govern as little as pos- 
sible. To the extent to which she has accepted and acted upon the 
principle that it is the true function of government to do whatever 
will promote the interest of the community better if undertaken by 
the ctmmunity than if left to private enterprise, just to that extent 
has she strengthened herself and secured the grateful loyalty of her 
people. So we, too, must proceed, if we would prepare for the con- 
structive uses of peace that grateful recognition of the value of the 
nation to its people, and that patriotic support of the people for the 
nation, which we are being exhorted to prepare for the destructive 
purposes of war. 

In the hmg retrospect we shall find nothing clearer than that the 
evoluti(!n of government is steadily toward the assumi)tion of new 
functions in the service of the i:>eople. Slowly but surely the move- 
ment has steadily gone forward in this direction, and always over 
the protests of those who have insisted that each advance was an 
unwarranted invasion of the field of private enterprise, of the rights 
and liberties of the individual. 

Even tlie collection of taxes for the support of the state was once 
farmed out to those who found in it an opportunity for private profit. 
The ]:)ractice found its justification in the claim that an army of 
tax collectors would be a public menace, and that the government 
could n(!t jiossibly collect the taxes as economically and efficiently as 
private individuals. To-day it Avould be a rare individual indeed 
who would conceive that it is not the function of the state directly 
to collect the taxes necessary for its own support. 

Time will not permit even the enumeration of other functions once 
supposed to be peculiarly private in their character, but which are 
now exercised bv the government almost as a matter of course. It is 



PRKPAKATKINS FOR PEACE. 27 

aliiiost axiomatic that the government shall conduct the Post Office, 
shall supply Mater, and shall extinguish fires. xVll of these things 
were once regarded as peculiarly sacred to priA'ate enterprise. I once 
represented a client who owned and operated as a private profit- 
making enterprise the sewer system of a thriving middle western 
town which was prevented by financial limitations in its charter from 
|)erforming this primary municipal function. In reading Ferrero I 
was amused and instructed by his account of the sources of the wealth 
and political power of Crassus in 69 B. C. Feri-ero says : 

Since the houses at lloine were mostly built of wood, and the .Ediles had so 
far failed to organize efiieient measures of prevention, fires were at this time 
exceedingly frequent. This suggested to him a very ingenious idea. He organ- 
ized a regular lire brigade from amongst his slaves, and established watch 
stations in every part of Kome. As soon as a fire broke out the watch ran to 
give notice to the brigade. The firemen turned out, but accompanied by a 
representative of Crassus, who bought up, practically for nothing, the house 
which was on fire, and sometijnes all the neighboring houses which happened 
to be threatened as well. The bargain once concluded, he had th.e fire j)ut out 
and the house rebuilt. In this way he secured i^ossession of a large numl)er of 
houses at a trifling cost, and became one of the largest landlords at Rome, both 
in houses and land, which he was then able, of course, to exchange, to sell, and to 
buy up again almost as he chose. Having become in this way one of the richest, 
if not the richest man in Rome, his power steadily increasing with every rise 
in the price of money, Crassus soon became a dominating figure in the Senate 
and the electorate, and indeed among all classes of the connnunity. 

Indeed, when later, an ajdile who sprang from the common people 
extended the function of government in Rome to include the oper- 
ation of a fire brigade, his activities were very much resented, and 
the j)rivileged classes found it difficult to explain and impossible to 
justify his popularity with the people. I have no doubt that Rome 
I'ang with the same arguments about the invasion of the field of 
private enterprise with which the public ownership of railroads and 
other public utilities is received in this country to-day. 

I am far from suggesting that in any given community, at any 
given time, it would be axiomatic, or even expedient, for the govern- 
ment to undertake all or any of these enterprises. I am merely assert- 
ing that it is by no means true that it should not do so solely because 
it VN'ould conflict Avith some dogmatic conception of the state. It is a 
([uestion of wise expediency inider existing conditions in every case, 
remembering always that the inexorable law of social evolution is 
moving steadily toward the assumption of community functions b,y 
the community. 

The argument that the goveinment has been too weak, too ineffi- 
cient, or too corrupt to be trusted with functions which might be 
performed by a better government is only a confession of the indict- 
ment against our government and us. It is quite true that, in deter- 
mining the ultimate interests of the community we must look for 
the long result. We must not destroy the incentives that are es.sen- 
tial to ])rogre.ss. The whole fabric of existing civilization is based 
upon the institution of private property, upon the conception that 
in the existing stage of human development the best and most effec- 
tive way in which to advance the well-being of mankind is by an 
appeal to the self-interest or the necessities of individuals; but even 
if we are entirely sui-e that necessity and financial gain are the most 
effective incentives to industrv for the mass of mankind, ai-e we not 



28 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 

all coming to see that there is a point at which we o^ eiload the lure i 
Once we rise above the pinch of poverty and attain physical comfort 
and intellectual opportunity, are there not other incentives besides 
money that will stimulate and attract the ver}^ highest talent and the 
very greatest industry? Is not this demonstrated by the financial 
sacrifices made by so many of the verj' best men in our public service? 
You know what the desires, the hopes, the aspirations that ani- 
mate you. What is it that you think would prove most satisfying 
and would call out the best there is in you ? Is it not the conscious 
and effective use of your faculties for the accomplishment of things 
which you think are worth while? Is not the basis of real happiness 
obscured by false standards of success? There are dangers in democ- 
racy, just as there are dangers in privilege, but mankind lias defi- 
nitely discarded the old ideal of aristocracy. The purpose of civi- 
lization is not to produce an efflorescence, but to elevate the mass. 
The aristocracy of the future is to be an aristocracy of service, not 
of privilege; of achievement, not of acquisition. 

The very first and most essential of all our preparation must be 
to make our government — local, state, and national — what it should 
be. This is the service for Avhich we need universal training and a 
patriotism that is nobler and more useful than all the patriotism of 
war. 

It is suggested that we already respond to the ci\ic appeal more 
easily than to the appeal for military sacrifice, but Hir;ini ^laxim 
says. 

I Avoiuior why it is that wo are not as enthusiastic- in this social service work 
as we are in attacking the problem of war. Is it that there is more glory and 
more that appeals to the martial imagination in attacking vs'ar and warriors 
than tliere is in the prosaic, tame, and glamorless enterprise of simply saving 
human life in p.eaceful pursuits for the mere sake of saving it? 

Senator Root has recently made an eloquent appeal for military 
preparation, in which he said : 

Do not let us deceive ourselves. Adecpiate pre])aration for the preservation 
of our liberty means a va.st expenditure, Imt it means more than that; it means 
a willingness for self-sacrifice, a spirit among our people, the length and br(\adth 
of the land, among the rich and the poor, among the highly educated and the 
graduates of the common school, among professional men, mejvhants and 
bankei-s, farmers and laborers — a national spirit among the people of the land, 
and a determination to preserve the liberty and justice of the American- Repub- 
lic and to make a sacrifice of means and convenience, comfort, and, if need be, 
of life, in the cause. 

To every word of this we should subscribe. But I wish the 
Senator had gone on to demonstrate — as he could do so well— that 
the patriotism and self-sacrifices of peace are of uiore transcendent 
importance, even as a preparation for war. than any present reso- 
lution of Avillingness to sacrifice " means and convenience, comfort, 
and, if need be, of life," upon the field of battle. I am not detract- 
ing in the least from the importance of making defensive military 
preparations; but a determination to preserve the liberty and justice 
of the American Republic, and to make some sacrifice of means and 
convenience and comfort in the piping times of peace will be our best 
preparation for war and our most likely insurance against it. 

Do not let us deceive ourselves. The United States of America, 
as a nation, is worth preserving, is entitled to our loyalty and de- 
votion, only to the extent that it is an agency to promote the moral. 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 29 

intellectual, and physical well-being of its people, not some of its 
people, but aW of its people— onl}^ to the extent that, in very truth, 
in the realities of the everyday life of the men, the women, and the 
children who inhabit it, its conscious ideal is the greatest good to the 
greatest number. To carry out that ideal means a vast expenditure, 
willingly and intelligently made; it means a preparedness for self- 
sacrifice in times of peace quite as much as in times of war — nay, a 
greater self-sacrifice, because the progress of civilization is measured 
by the extent to which peace supersedes and supplants Avar. It means 
a spirit among our people the length and breadth of the land, among 
the rich and the poor-, among the highly educated and the graduates 
of the common school and those to whom fortune unhappil}^ has given 
no schooling at all, among professional men, merchants and bankers, 
farmers and laborers — a national spirit cletermined to make the 
American Republic an agency of liberty and justice at home and 
abroad. 

In the service of this ideal, let us destroy every special privilege 
and be prepared to sacrifice means and convenience and comfort and, 
if need be, life itself to protect that government and the people it 
governs against every assault by force or cunning, whether from 
within or from without. Let us make social justice and social 
service our national ideal; and to this end let us control and develop 
our national resources in times of peace, not only that they may be 
mobilized in time of war, but because a government which is per- 
forming this sort of service to its people will be thus most effectively 
organized for peace. By all means, let us have an army and a navy 
adequate for the defense of such a nation, but let us realize that far 
more imporant than armies and navies are our national purposes 
and policies. 

Are Ave really Avithout the desire and the hope that the United 
States may acquire exceptional advantages in the commercial dcA^el- 
opment of other countries — let us say, in this hemisphere or parts of 
it, in Cuba and the "West Indies, in Mexico and Central America? 
Are we entirely free from the subconscious thought that here is our 
sphere of influence? Hoav far is this thought at the bottom of the 
modern development of the Monroe Doctrine, especially as conceived 
by Secretary Olney Avhen he declared that " the United States is 
practically soA^ereign on this continent "? Is it because of its hoped- 
for economic advantages to us that we insist upon a doctrine which 
seems no longer to haA'e any political justification? Certainly Ave 
are no longer in apj^rehension that our republican form of gOA^ern- 
ment would seriously be jeopardized if any European nation should 
acquire political dominion over, or should plant its colonies in. South 
America. Those countries repudiate and resent our assumption of a 
benevolent protectorate over their national interests. They look 
with suspicion upon all our declarations of disinterestedness and 
point to our dealinizs Avith Mexico in the acquisition of Texas and 
California and to other incidents in our history as proof of the justice 
of their fears. Even the declaration of President Wilson, that this 
country will neA^er again seek to acquire a foot of territory by force 
of arms, is regarded merely as the expression of a personal opinion, 
or as in the same class Avith the diplomatic assurance of pacific inten- 
tion which has usually preceded the extension of the" British or the 
French or the German or the Italian domains. 



30 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 

There is a clearer mutual understanding and a closei' community 
of political and commercial interest between the principal countries 
of South America and the great nations of Europe than between 
those countries and oui'selves. The ties of race and language and 
religion are closer. Few of our people understand how the eastward 
trend of the southern portion of this hemisphere brings South 
America into as close or closer proximity to Europe than to the 
United States, especialW wdien available trade routes are taken into 
consideration. South American development has been financed in 
Europe, not in the United States, and to attempt to expand our com- 
merce in that direction without assuming the large financial obliga- 
tions that are essential to it is merely to work against the natural 
laws of trade. 

Pan Americanism exalts physical geography, which is important; 
but commercial, intellectual, and racial geography is more important. 
Pan Americanism must be based on and be measured by real mutu- 
ality of interest and obligation. We should recognize and strengthen 
our mutual interests with Latin America, but we should not forget 
other e(|ually or more important interests in Canada or Europe. 
The preservation of existing political geography to the south of us 
against change by violence should tend to increase stability where 
this is especially desirable; but why should we insist that the Amer- 
icas are a separate international unit over which the United States is 
to maintain a benevolent protectorate at its own risk and without 
control over their domestic conditions or foreign policies? 

To assert that the Monroe Doctrine is essential to our national 
safety has become an absurdity. Monarchical institutions no longer 
threaten our Republic. We have lived to see a republican form of 
government firmly established in France and to see constitutional 
monarchy develop steadily toward the essentials of representative 
democracy. We have lived for more than a century in immediate con- 
tact with a great self-governing colony of England, with the result 
that w^e have influenced its institutions far more than it has influ- 
enced ours. The whole purpose of President Monroe's famous dec- 
laration and the whole justification for making it have undergone 
a transformation so complete that nothing but the lack of intelligent 
discussion of the question can explain the extent to which it is 
regarded as something as lioly as the Ark of the Covenant by so 
man}' of the American people. 

It is safe to say that we believe in something called the Monroe 
Doctrine because we do not understand it and are making no attempt 
whatever to define it or to appraise its value to us. Let us not con- 
fuse it with that doctrine which is practically recognized by all the 
great nations of the world. \iz, that wherever a nation is in fact so 
situated that the acquisition or control of inniiediately adjacent 
countries by great and povrerful rivals would jeo[)ardize its peace 
and security, that nation, in the exercise of its right of self-detcMise, 
can justly insist upon its rival refraining from such an extension of 
its domain. The ])oint is well illustrated by the declaration of Paul 
Kohrbach with reference to the possible absorption of Holland by 
(lermany. He says: "The resulting disturbance of the political 
eijuilibrium in Euroj)e would be so distinctly in favor of (Germany 
that all the other States would be justified in rising in protest against 
it." The right of a nation to ])rote('t its vital interests has been uni- 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 31 

versally recognized, subject always to the possible exercise of suj^erior 
force to override the objection. No nation has questioned the right 
of another nation to assert its vital interests, although it may have 
questioned its power to maintain them. The issue is an issue of fact. 
Does the particular thing which is threatened jeopardize the vital 
interests of the protesting nation'^ 

The Monroe Doctrine has never been accepted by other nations as 
sound in principle, although the acquiescence of Great Britain has 
prevented it from being challenged ; but if we Avere frankly to assert 
that the acquisition of Mexico by a European nation would be re- 
garded as an unfriendly act because it threatened the vital interests 
of the United States it is exceedingly unlikely that there would be 
any attempt to deny that we were justified in interfering. Whether 
we slioidd assert such an interest in the future of Mexico would de- 
pend upon the question of fact as to its influence upon our national 
security. Whether our interest weald be admitted would depend 
upon tile (juestion of fact as to the etl'ect of the proposed action upon 
the vital interests of this nation. It might depend upon our military 
ability to sustain our i)osition; but what I am trying to make clear 
is that the validity of the INIonroe Doctrine depends upon principles 
of universal international application and not upon principles 
peculiar to us or to the American continents. 

In the interests of national security we should ourselves confine 
the Monroe Doctrine to these limits. In its present vague form it is 
a menace to our peace and to the peace of the world — all the more 
dangerous because we have iu)t now, and we do not propose to have, 
militai'v force sufficient to maintain it if it should be seriously ques- 
tioned. Nothing is so dangerous to peace as the assertion of a right 
vx'hicli is oli'ensive to others, which they believe to be unjustified, and 
which we are not, and do not expect to be, prepared to defend. It 
is in sui)]>ort of the broader Monroe D( ctrine and incidentally to get 
the support of the Pacific Coast that the Navy League is insisting 
that we should have a navy on the Pacific stronger than Japan's 
and another navy on the Atlantic stronger than the navy of any other 
nation except England — a policy which, fortunately, there seems to 
be no probability whatever of the United States being persuaded to 
adopt. .Vnd yet. if we do uvX have such a navy, I must agree with 
Homer Lea when he says that " the Monroe Doctrine, if not supported 
by naval and mility power sufficient to enforce its (;bservance by all 
nations singly and in coalition, becomes a factor more provocative 
of war than any otlier national polic.y ever attempted in modern or 
ancient times."' 

Our greatest duty, theref ( re, is not to build fleets to maintain the 
Monroe Doctrine, but it is to consider v.hether the Moni'oe Doctrine, 
in any < ther sense than the protection of our vital national interests, 
is worth the risk of war and the cost of preparing for it. It it can 
not be ju..-tified ujxm the ground of defense, can it be justified upon 
the ground of self-interest^ The Mcmroe Doctrine may have helped 
drive Maximilian out of Mexico. It may have served us in some 
indeterminate directions during the first half of our national exist- 
ence, but if it has profited us in any other way the evidence does not 
seem to be available. Certainly we can show'no financial \)voi\t and 
no prosjxvt in this direction. 



32 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 

It may not be clear that our trade in Latin America would have 
been substantially greater if it had been colonized by European na- 
tions and developed under their flags, but it certainly is not clear that 
this would net have been the case. Our total trade wqth South 
America for the year ending June 30, 1913 (unaffected by war), 
was a little over '$360,000,000. Our trade with Canada the same 
year w^as over $535,000,000. Approximately $162,000,000 of our 
South American trade was with Brazil alone, the greater portion 
being imports of coffee, which Ave may safely assume would have 
sought a market in this country no matter under what flag the coffee 
had been raised. It seems equally true that our sales of agricultural 
implements to South America Avould doubtless have been as great if 
the flag of England or Germany or France or Ital}^ or Spain had 
been flying in the southern portion of the liemisphere. 

I am not regretting the political independence of the South Ameri- 
can republics. On the contrary, I share in the feeling of pride in 
their achievements, which is perhaps not justified by our contribution 
to that result. I am merely pointing out that the further assertion 
of the Monroe Doctrine w^ould seem to have no justification in the 
commercial results obtained by it; and the extension of our trade 
in the future will depend upon considerations with which the Monroe 
Doctrine has nothing whatever to do. But even if it were true that 
its abandonment would result in some diminution of our commerce, 
wdiich I do not believe, the loss would be utterly insignificant in com- 
parison with the expenditure we shall have to make if the Monroe 
Doctrine is to be anything but a source of w^eakness and of danger. 

There is a widespread popular impression that Germany has ulte- 
rior designs on South America, and that, if successful in the present 
war, she will restrict the trade of other nations and discriminate 
against this country. I find no justification for this opinion. I have 
no doubt that Germany resents and disagrees with the doctrine of 
Monroe. I have no doubt that, whether successful or unsuccessful in 
the war, she will seek to push her trade and commerce in South 
America. But all of the indications are that Germany has been look- 
ing to the Near and Middle East as the field peculiarly adapted for 
her political and commercial expansion. It is the Bagdad Railroad 
and the ancient Babvlonian empire upon which she seems to have 
fixed her desires, and with respect to which she so bitterly resents 
the restrictions for which she holds England responsible. There is 
much misunderstanding about German colonization in South 
America. It is estimated that the total German immigration now in 
Argentina, for instance, is only 30,000, while there are 950.000 
Italians and 150,000 French.^ I have been unable to obtain the total 
figures for Brazil, but in 1910 the immigration was 30,857 Portu- 
guese, 20,843 Spanish, 14,163 Italians, 3,902 Germans, etc. 

I shall refer to only one other matter of this character, and that is 
our relations with Japan; and I select them because we are supposed 
by many to be in greater danger of a collision with Japan than with 
anj^ other nation, unless it be Germany. It is said that Japan is likely 
to attack us, because we offer an enticing opportunity for loot, because 

1 The oflicial immigration ligures in Argentina for the period from 1857 to 1908 are as 
follows : 

Italian. l,700,42:i ; Spanish, 7nr),243 ; French, 188, .S16; English, 42,705; Austro-Hun- 
garian, .''.9,800 ; German, 40,055 ; Swiss, 28,:U4 : Belgian, 20,008 ; other, 203.242. The 
emigration was a little less than half the immi.^vation. 



PRKPARATIONS F0I5 I'KACMO. 33 

Japan wishes to .acquire the Philippines, and because she wishes to 
force us to accept her people as immigrants and to treat them on a 
parity with the immigrants from other countries. 

I think we may dismiss, as unAvorthy of our own intelligence, the 
suggestion that Japan would make a wanton attack upon this country 
merely in the hope of exacting an indemnity or of pilaging our 
Pacific coast. Japan has done nothing that would justify the assump- 
tion that she would be influenced by such a motive, even if she could 
be persuaded that she would succeed. No nation in the history of the 
world has so clearly earned the right to have its motives, its intelli- 
gence, and its achievements treated with respect than has Japan. 
Her ambition is clearly to secure the respect of the civilized world 
and to deserve it. In my judgment she will be more punctilious in 
respect to international morals than many nations that boast a 
broader civilization. But if nothing else Avould restrain her she is 
too intelligent not to know that all she could secure in the way of 
pecuniary advantage would have to be returned manyfold in the 
competition of armaments that would inevitably ensue, until this 
country had made her atone for every wrong that she had done to 
us. The day of the international marauder on any such scale as this 
is over. 

The Open Door in China is one of the issues which are thought to 
be provocative of trouble with Japan. Hiram Maxim says a Japa- 
nese diplomat asked him by what logic we can proclaim America 
for the Americans and disclaim Japan's right equally to proclaim 
Asia for the Asiatics. What is the answ^er^ Baron Shibusawa re- 
cently said in my hearing that Japan was especially desirous of 
cordial relations with the United States for three reasons : First, be- 
cause Japan recognized many obligations of gratitude to the United 
States for our conspicuous part in the acceptance and development of 
modern conditions and institutions by Japan ; secondly, because one- 
fourth of Japan's foreign commerce was with the United States, and 
Japan was anxious to retain and increase it; thirdly, because the 
greatest w^orld problem was the adjustment and mutual understand- 
ing of oriental and occidental civilization, and that Japan believed 
the two nations best adapted to bring this about were Japan and the 
United States working sympathetically together for this purpose. 
Such speeches may be only international compliments, but they de- 
serve thoughtful consideration. 

As to the Philippines, there is no evidence that Japan desires them 
at this time, when her hands are fiill to overflowing with opportuni- 
ties in Korea and China. And what is our policy in the Philippines? 
Do we really intend to establish there an independent nation? Do 
we propose to retain control over its international policies after we 
.have given it independence? If we do not control, do we none the 
less propose to protect the Philippine nation against the consequences 
of its own policies or to guarantee its sovereignty or territorial in- 
tegrity? If we seek to retain no special advantages over other 
nations in the commercial development of the Philippine Islands and 
•are animated by sincerely benevolent motives, should we not seek to 
secure international guaranties that would be far more effective than 
anything that we alone can do to assui-e independence of the nation 

.S. Doc. 323, G4-1 3 ' ,... 



34 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 

for whose existence we are to be responsible? Is it at all clear that 
Japan would not gladly join in such an arrangement? 

The remaining source of future trouble with Japan is the policy 
which we adopt toward her with respect to immigration and the 
rights of her people while residing in this country. There can be no 
question that Japan resents the manner in which her people are being 
treated on the Pacific coast. Whether California is justified or not 
in the substance of what she seeks by restricting the rights of the 
Japanese to acquire and hold land is entirely outside the point. The 
citizens of the United States are under restriction with respect to 
land ownership in Japan, and this subject is susceptible of diplomatic 
adjustment on a basis that will recognize the mutual self-respect of 
both countries. Japan has given evidence of the most substantial 
character of her desire to meet and treat this issue in a broad-minded 
and practical way. She asks merely that it shall be so treated. If 
we treat her thus, and have California treat her thus, we shall do 
more to reduce the probability of friction with Japan than all the 
naval and military preparations we shall make against her. 

It is said, however, that we must enormously increase our Navy 
if we are to protect our interests .in the Panama Canal. Before the 
Canal was constructed the argument ran quite the other way. The 
construction of the Canal was so to facilitate the passage of our fleet 
from the Atlantic to the Pacific, or the reverse, that it would double 
the efficiency of the fleet, and constitute an asset of incalculable value 
in the event of war. Now, hovever, it has become merely an exten- 
sion of our coast line, a vulnerable point which it is essential to take 
extraordinary precautions to protect. If this is true, we have gained 
only a military liability by the construction of the Canal, having 
admitted the merchant vessels of all nations to the Canal on a parity 
with our own. Proximity to the Canal is our only advantage over 
other nations so far as our foreign commerce is concerned. If it 
is to take a huge navy to protect it so that it may be used for the 
passage of our fleets in time of war, there would seem to have been 
little net gain from a military point of view. Should we not be far 
better off if, having made this splendid contribution to the commerce 
of the world, we should now completely neutralize the Canal, under 
international guaranties, in which we should invite all civilized 
nations to join? The basis of the agreement might be either the 
closing of the Canal to the warships of belligerent nations, or the 
opening of the Canal to all belligerents alike, upon the condition that 
no encounter should be permitted to take place within a specified 
distance from either entrance. The practicability of this plan would 
necessarily depend upon the extent to which the Canal could be 
secured from injury or a surprise attack from some belligerent who 
did not respect its obligations. Either plan would prooably result 
in greater protection of our interests in the Canal than any security 
derived from the size of the fleet available for its defense in the event 
of war 1 etween the United States and anv first-class naval power. 

But the necessity of naval protection for the Canal must be con- 
sidered in the light of Gen. Goethals's testimony before the sub- 
committee of the Committee on Approprintions of the House of 
Representatives. Gen. Goethals testified that on the assumption 
that the naval contest had been ended, and that the control of the 
sea rested with the enemy, so that the enemy's transports were free 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 35 

and able to land troops, a force of 25,000 men with proper land de- 
fenses would be able to hold off an invading expedition against the 
Panama Canal at least as long as the time that was necessary for the 
capture of Port Arthur. If this be true, it would seem clear that 
the defense of the Panama Canal would necessitate no departure 
from the defensive naval policy in which the submarine would 
largely replace the dreadnaught and the battle cruiser. The Canal 
is perculiarly adapted for defense by submarines, and there is a dif- 
ference of expert opinion as to whether its land defenses should not 
be confined to defense against raids. 

It will naturally be said that even if we abandon the policy of ex- 
tending our commercial interests by force or by the show of force 
other nations will not do so, and unless we are prepared to assert our 
rights in foreign lands our financial interests will suffer, our pride 
be humbled, and our people be humiliated and abused. There are 
cases in which we must be prepared to send warships into foreign 
seas to enforce respect for the flag of the United States and for 
those who are entitled to its protection. The policies I am suggest- 
ing would never leave this country without a Navy containing suffi- 
cient warships to compel the respect of or to punish those inferior 
nations from which we need have any apprehension of wanton in- 
sult or ill treatment of our nationals. No civilized nation of conse- 
quence would in time of peace refuse atonement for insult or injury 
to any of our people. We may conclusively assume that every repa- 
ration would be made, and every precaution would be taken against 
the repetition of such an incident. Nothing but the willingness of 
the offending nation to proceed to war would call for a larger Navy 
than we should have ; and our naval policies in the event of war 
would depend upon, and be determined by, the larger considerations 
to which I have referred. Assuming that we were protected at home 
against invasion, we might effectively resort to other weapons than 
the use of force. There are some conceptions of national honor and 
of what is essential for its vindication that are reminiscent of the 
code duello; but they can not long survive that discredited institution. 

To the contention that we must have a navy adequate to protect 
our foreign trade and keep open the highways of commerce, it seems 
sufficient to reply that unless we develop a real merchant marine our 
foreign commerce would be carried on neutral ships ; that no blockade 
of our extensive coasts could be made effective ; and that nothing but 
the dominion of the seas could give us an assurance of uninterrupted 
foreign trade if private commerce is not to be safe under the sanctions 
of international law. General Greene has aptly said : 

We do not need and will not have in this country an army of seven hundred 
thousand men, as some ill-balanced enthusiasts demand; we are not compelled 
to and we will not enter the battleship race of England and Germany. England 
must run this race or die. We are not so situated, and it would be supreme 
folly for us to waste our resources or our thoughts on any such contest. 

But a defensive military policy dees not assume a policy of inter- 
national isolation. If there is anything which this war and the 
issues arising out of this war have made clear, it is that no nation 
can longer live unto itself, and least of all that a great commercial 
nation like the United States can refrain from active and direct par- 
ticipation in the determination of those policies and the creation of 
those agencies by which law is to be substituted for war and the 



36 PREPAEATIONS FOR PEACE. 

peaceful development of the Avorld is to be assured. The peaceful 
development of the United States is indissolubly linked with the 
peaceful development of Europe and the world. We can no longer 
refrain frcm alliances because they may involve us in issues from 
which, thus far, we have happily been free. We must take our place 
in the family of nations and assume our full measure of responsibil- 
ity. Nor need we despair of making substantial progress toward 
the substitution of peaceful means for the settlement of international 
differences by force of arms. 

The declaration of President Wilson with regard to Pan Amer- 
icanism in his annual message should serve the useful purpose of 
directing public attention to the inapplicability of the old conceptions 
of the Monroe doctrine to existing conditions. If this nation is really 
definitely to abandon the role " which it was always difficult to main- 
tain without offense to the pride of the peoples whose freedom of 
action we sought to protect, and without provoking serious miscon- 
ceptions of our motives," and is to interpret the Monroe Doctrine as 
an invitation to " a full and honorable association, as of partners, 
between ourselves and our neighbors, in the interest of all America, 
north and south," it marks a tremendous forward step in the national 
policies of the United States. It, must not be forgotten, however, 
that the invitation has not 3^et been accepted, and, above all, that it 
has not yet been embodied in any internaticnal undertakings that can 
be regarded as a substitute for the doctrine of Monroe. 

The President's message is admirable so far as it goes, but it leaves 
unanswered the question as to what this country would propose to 
do in any of the contingencies to which I have referred. Are we to 
have a defensive alliance with the Latin- American nations, and if so, 
upon what mutual terms and conditions? Can we, and shall we, 
make a real start toward " the parliament of man, the federation of 
the world." by a Pan American alliance in the interests of peace? 
Undoubtedly there never was an opportunity so favorable as this; 
and why should we not press home our opportunity by inaugurating 
that League to Enforce Peace, which is the most practical of all the 
suggestions that have thus far been made for the substitution of law 
for Avar by international agreement? 

I trust that the Chamber of Commerce of the United States will 
seize the opportunity which is peculiarly within its grasp. Never, it 
seems to me, was anything more timely than the referendum which is 
now being taken by that great national association of the business 
interests of America. I think it is safe to assume that few, indeed, 
in this audience are aware of an event which is almost epochal in 
its importance. 

On the 2d day of September, 1915, a Special Committee of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, composed of 
men of large business experience, representing commercial institu- 
tions of the highest and most conservative standing, unanimously 
reccmmended that Congress and the President be called uj^on to do 
all in their power to pronute the establishment of: 

1. A more comprehensive and better-defined sea law. 

2. An International Court. 

n. A (/oniK'il of Conciliation. 

4. Intornntional Conferences for the better establishment and progressive* 
umendment of International Law. 



1 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 37 

5. The organization of a System of Commercial and Financial Non-Inter- 
course, to be followed by military force, if necessary, to be applied to tliose 
nations entering into tlie foregoing arrangements and tlien going to war with- 
out first submitting their differences to an agreed-iipon tribunal/ 

The first four of these recommendations are regarded as based 
upon considerations so convincing that the committee appointed to 
formulate arguments against the recommendations involved, so 
that all phases of the question should be presented on the taking of 
the referendum, said : 

It is assumed that the first four proposals of the conmiittee are directed to 
conditions so well understood thai: the agreement about the answers to them 
is so nearly universal as to render unnecessary any attempt to formulate ob- 
jections to them. 

As to the fifth proposal, the committee which is in charge of the 
referendum vote states that 'it involves the adoption of a new prin- 
ciple " which, however moderate in its immediate form, may be re- 
garded as a departure from accepted rules of conduct in international 
law " ; and it sets forth a number of objections, which it says " may 
be deserving of attention." 

All of these objections, however, were met in advance in the 
unanimous report of the special committee. Having already pointed 
out that "the problem of securing peace and justice among nations 
is simply an extension of what we have successfully solved in the 
national and municipal realms," and that international conferences 
have already secured results of the greatest importance for the peace 
and progress of the world, the committee expresses the opinion that — 

This movement toward international agreement and law was gaining In 
strength each year. Stopped by the war, there is little doubt that it will re- 
vive stronger, and pursue its course in a more regular and systematic way 
v.'hen the war is over. Business men perhaps more than others should be anx- 
ious to support such endeavors for a better understaitcling among nations, 
establishing more firmly enlightened standards to govern their interrelations 
and furnishing a more elaborate and organic body of international public and 
administrative law. The present war has again incontrovertibly shown the 
fundamental need for this. The problem is, then, not new or novel, but needs 
only to be broadened and organized to yield all the desired benefits. * * * 
There is a difiierence of opinion as to the employment of force to compel any 
signatory nation to submit its cause to an international tribunal l^efore going 
to war." Your Committee, liowever. believes that tlie great majority of the 
practical men of the United States ^^'ho hold themselves responsil)le for reason- 
able progress see the necessity of the employment of an adequate pressure or 
force to compel signatory nations to bring their cause before an International 
Court or Council of Conciliation before going to war; because however desir- 
able it may be, theoretically, not to use force, yet the history of the last 100 
years, the many wars during that time, and the events of the present war have , 
made apparent the fundamental need of an international power to enforce 
the submission of international disputes to a court. The alternative is con- 
stantly recurring wars, and, in the interval between these wars, the increasing 
absorption in preparation for war of the resources of the principal nations of 
the world. 

The committee demonstrates the wisdom and the practicability of 
the use of economic pressure as a preliminary to the use of force, and 
point out that, while such pressure involves economic loss to the 



1 The preliminary count of the votes of the constituent members of the national chamlier 
on this referendum, announced or January 5, 1916. showed the following results: Propo- 
sition 1 : Tfio in favor. L'9 opposed ; proposition 2 : 7.5:? in favor, 21 opposced : proposition 
3: 744 in favor, 2S opposed; proposition 4: 769 in favor, IH opposed; proposition 5(a): 
55G In favor, 157 opposed (economic pressure) ; proposition 5(6) : 452 in favor, 249 
opposed (military force). 



38 PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 

nations that apply it, " war, too, is costly and self -injurious to the. 
nations which essay it." 

Your Committee has studied sympathetically the arguments of those who, on 
principle, oppose all force, even to enforce law instead of war ; likewise, the 
argument of those who respect the tradition that the United States should 
" keep free of entangling alliances." It muse he conceded that the lattei- de- 
scribed a past policy inider which our nation has grown in prosperity and hap- 
piness. But your Committee is forced to see that our country is already di- 
rectly involved in the present war, because the lives and prosperity of Ameri- 
can citizens have been involved, and because the future peace and prosperity 
of our country will be involved in the settlement of the war. 

Your Committee believes that American citizens, realizing the world's im- 
perative need of the substitution of law for war, if militarism is not to dominate, 
are ready, nay, feel it the clear call of duty, to take their share of the work 
find responsibility necessary to establish this substituiion. We can not escape 
if we would, we would not if we could ; the call of women and children, of 
the helpless and the weak, suffering indescribably from needless war, is an 
irresistible compulsion to all Americans, and, not least, to American business 
men. * * * 

Knowing that civilization is made up of the work and suffering and martyr- 
doms of the past, we are willing, yes, anxious, to "pay back," in kind if neces- 
sary, what we are enjoying, if thereby we can help on this greatest forward 
step of civilization — the substitution of law for war. I'our Committee believes 
that the time is ripe, as never before, for the fundamental advance in civiliza- 
tion that the establishing of an International Court and Council represents. 
* * * Your Committee believes that it is practically possible that the time 
has arrived, if the United States will but do its share of the work. There is 
little real hope for success if the United States is not a part of it. * * * 
If, at the close of the war there exists the legalized purpose of the United States 
to join in the work needed too enforce peace, there will be a most practical 
reason to expect success for this so necessary step forward. In fact, the begin- 
ning of the necessary organization may be in existence at that time, by reason 
of the agreement between the United States and some of the neutral nations 
of South America and Europe. It is a great opportunity, perhaps the greatest 
that has ever come to any nation. It is a great adventure practically within 
our power to promote — an enterprise that appeals to all that is best in us — an 
opportunity we will not miss. 

Remember these are not the words and this is not the action of a 
body of visionary enthusiasts; it is the unanimous recommendation 
of a special committee of the greatest commercial body in this coun- 
try, appointed "to examine into the relations between the present 
war and business, and submit suggestions as to the future." Nor is 
it the only indication of the progress of higher ideals in international 
relations. 

There is a dispatch which was sent by Sir Edward Grey to Sir 
Edward Goshen, British Ambassador at Berlin, at the very crisis of 
the diplomatic interchanges which preceded the war, which I have 
read and reread with mingled feelings of sadness and hope. It has 
always seemed to me the most tragic of all the official documents 
which have been published by the Avarring nations, and, at the same 
time, the most encouraging. Just as it seemed inevitable that the 
explosion would occur, that the catastrophe must happen, after the 
suggestions and countersuggestions, the complaints and countercom- 
plaints had been discussed under the forms and usages of diplomacy, 
Sir Edward Grey struck a new note that went straight to the heart 
of the underlying cause of all the difficulty. On July 30, 1914, he 
authorized Sir Edward Goshen to say to the German Chancellor: 

If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present crisis safely passed, 
my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement, to which Germany could 
be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy 



PREPARATIONS FOR PEACE. 39 

would be pursued against her or her allies, by France, Russia, and ourselves, 
jointly or separately. I liave desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, 
through the last Balkan crisis, and Germany having a corresponding object, 
our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to 
form the subject of definite i>roposals ; but if this present crisis, so much more 
acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, 
I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible 
some more definite rapprochement between the powers than has been possible 
hitherto. 

Sir Edward Grey did not indicate exactly what he had in mind, 
but with the fate of Europe trembling in the balance, Utopia seemed 
nearer and more practically available than had seemed possible be- 
fore. It was to be " some more definite rapjyrochement between the 
powers than has been possible hitherto " — some arrangement to which 
Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no 
aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies 
" by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately." Oh, the 
pity that Utopia had not seemed nearer a little while before; that 
this dispatch should have waited for " this present crisis, so much 
more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations." 
What a tragedy that it should have been received by a chancellor 
who heard it without comment " because His Excellency was so 
taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier." 

That dispatch has not yet been answered. The German Chancellor 
asked for and received a copy as a memorandum, as " he would like 
to reflect on it before giving an answer." He has had much time and 
much occasion to reflect. That dispatch Avill be unanswered at the 
close of the war. The future of mankind depends upon the spirit in 
which its discussion is resumed, and upon the conditions which then 
exist. After this present conflict, so much more destructive and 
appalling than any that Europe has gone through, why should not 
the United States hold open a road that will at least lead toward 
Utopia by adopting the suggestions on which the members of the 
national Chamber of Commerce are now voting — by having in ex- 
istence the beginning of a League to Enforce Peace by agreements 
then already made between the United States and some of the neutral 
nations of South America and Europe? Si vis pacem para pacern. 
If we wish peace let us prepare for peace. 



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